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PREFACE 
 
 
The contents of this eBook deal with important subject matters that are highly 
relevant from numerous perspectives. 
The primary issue concerns energy supply and safety. The current crisis between 
Russia and the Ukraine and the resulting repercussions (and conflict) throughout Europe 
serve as backdrop to the acceleration of offshore oil and gas exploration and 
exploitation initiatives in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas that we have witnessed over the 
past few years. Activities that call for new regulations and improved cooperation among 
the States involved. Which brings us to this book’s second area of interest and some 
novel reflections regarding the question of “reinforcing” cooperation in enclosed and 
semi-enclosed seas. It is a known fact that it was the intention of UNCLOS to highlight 
this need to the coastal States of these seas, a need that is quite obvious in the Adriatic 
as it is, in effect, a “semi-enclosed Sea in a semi-enclosed Sea”. But we also know that 
this need is anything but fulfilled, either in the Mediterranean or elsewhere. A great deal 
of attention is being given today, for example, to the conflicts and claims of the coastal 
States of the South China Sea (also called “Oriental Sea”), especially regarding the 
exploration and exploitation of energy resources. Although much less acute, the 
abundance of data available indicates there is a great deal of disagreement (rather than 
cooperation) in the Adriatic also.  
This is shown, first of all, by the lack of any delimitation agreements concerning the 
continental shelf exploitation between States issuing from the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, primarily because of incompatible claims. Secondly, by the existence of an 
ongoing crisis of the solutions that appeared to have been reached. Good examples are 
the Memorandum of Understanding between Italy and Malta and the agreement 
between Greece and Albania, the latter annulled by the Constitutional Court of Albania. 
In other cases it is nature itself that complicates solutions because of the geological and 
geomorphologic configuration of the seabed and the subsoil.  
To all this we must add the continuing economic crisis. Consequently, in this sector 
also, and as happened in the past with regard to the exploitation of fishing and 
environmental governance, coastal States have proceeded unilaterally, issuing national 
laws and regulations and unhesitatingly attributing rights of exploration, exploitation 
and construction of offshore platforms. To this end we also point to Italy's “wait and 
see” approach, as it decided to take action (by initiating the National Energy Strategy 
through Law 12.9.14) only after the initiatives of other States made it inevitable for it to 
do so. Obviously at this point several questions emerge concerning the sustainability by 
such a fragile ecosystem as the Adriatic (and the Mediterranean in general) of the 
activities currently in progress as well as those to be implemented in the years to come 
in order to provide new sources of energy. 
These environmental concerns represent the third aspect of general interest dealt with 
in the contributions that follow. The Mediterranean most probably could not assimilate 
and overcome an incident of a gravity comparable to what happened in the Gulf of 
Mexico in 2010. The authors of the essays contained herein also demonstrate that the 
existing legal and operational instruments, both on an international level (UNCLOS in 
primis) and within the European Union, are obsolete and certainly inadequate to deal 
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with the phenomena in question and that what is required at this point (in addition to 
cooperation as previously mentioned) is recourse to the general principles of precaution, 
prevention and environmental sustainability. 
In conclusion, this is a highly useful work, as it provides information not always 
readily available and an in-depth analysis from diverse perspectives (as the authors 
belong to different scientific sectors), of a topic that will interest scholars and 
researchers in the years to come. It also proves that the Law of the Sea is in constant 
evolution and always of great relevance. Which cannot but gratify the President of the 
International Association of the Law of the Sea. 
 
GIUSEPPE CATALDI 
Professor of International Law, University of Napoli “L’Orientale” 
Chairman, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence on the Protection of Migrants Rights in the Mediterranean 
President, International Association of the Law of the Sea 
 
  
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
OFFSHORE SHARED NATURAL RESOURCES AND 
THE DUTY TO COOPERATE IN A SEMI-ENCLOSED SEA 
 
Andrea Caligiuri 
 
 
The Adriatic Sea is undoubtedly a semi-enclosed sea under Art. 122 UNCLOS.1 It 
forms a long but relatively narrow gulf, generally aligned from northwest to southeast, 
toward its only access, the Strait of Otranto.2 The Adriatic Sea connects the territories of 
seven States: Italy, Slovenia, Croatia and Greece, EU Member States; two candidate 
States, Montenegro and Albania and a potential candidate State, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which has a portion of territorial sea surrounded by the waters of Croatia. 
Under Art. 122 UNCLOS, the Ionian Sea could also be regarded as a semi-enclosed 
sea when its coastal States – Albania, Greece and Italy – will proclaim their exclusive 
economic zones; indeed, a semi-enclosed sea may consist “entirely or primarily” of the 
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more States.3 
It has long been recognized that the Adriatic and the Ionian are seas under stress; in 
particular, the Adriatic Sea especially in light of its semi-enclosed character with limited 
water exchange with the Mediterranean Sea. The marine environment of the Adriatic 
and Ionian is mainly vulnerable for a worrying combination of factors: pollution from 
land sources and ships, litter, impact on biodiversity, overfishing and coastal 
degradation. 
Art. 123 UNCLOS states “States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should 
cooperate with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their 
duties under this Convention. (…)”.4  
                                                           
1
 Under Art. 122 UNCLOS, “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea” means “a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by 
two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or 
primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States”. 
2
 The International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) defines the boundary between the Adriatic and the 
Ionian seas as a line running from the Butrinto River's mouth (39°44'N) in Albania to the Karagol Cape in 
Corfu, through this island to the Kephali Cape (these two capes are in latitude 39°45'N), and on to the 
Santa Maria di Leuca Cape (39°48'N); see IHO, Limits of Oceans and Seas (Special Publication No. 28), 
3rd Edition 1953, 17. 
3
 The IHO defines the limits of the Ionian Sea as follows: On the North – A line running from the mouth 
of the Butrinto River (39°44'N) in Albania, to Cape Karagol in Corfu (39°45'N), along the North Coast of 
Corfu to Cape Kephali (39°45'N) and from thence to Cape Santa Maria di Leuca in Italy. On the East – 
From the mouth of the Butrinto River in Albania down the coast of the mainland to Cape Matapan. On 
the South – A line from Cape Matapan to Cape Passero, the Southern point of Sicily. On the West – The 
East coast of Sicily and the Southeast coast of Italy to Cape Santa Maria di Leuca”; see IHO, Limits of 
Oceans and Seas (Special Publication No. 28), 3rd Edition 1953, 17. 
4
 The peculiarity of closed and semi-enclosed seas is also taken into account by the 1995 Agreement for 
the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks. See Art. 15 (Enclosed and semi-enclosed seas): “In implementing this Agreement 
in an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, States shall take into account the natural characteristics of that sea 
and shall also act in a manner consistent with Part IX of the Convention and other relevant provisions 
thereof”. 
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One of the most recent problems in the Adriatic and Ionian cooperation is related to 
exploration and exploitation activities of oil and gas by coastal States. There are two 
main reasons that make these activities a matter of direct confrontation rather than 
cooperation: the absence of delimitation agreements of the continental shelf between the 
States of the former Yugoslavia and the presence of oil and gas fields that are shared, 
because of geological and geomorphologic configuration of seabed and subsoil in the 
Adriatic Sea. 
In relation to the first element, an example of rivalry between States is a consequence 
of the decision of the Government of Croatia to give to some foreign leaseholders the 
right to explore and exploit the hydrocarbons in blocks 27, 28 and 29 of the Adriatic 
Sea, which are located in whole or in part in the maritime area claimed by Montenegro. 
The unilateral action of Croatia was stigmatized by the Government of Montenegro 
with two diplomatic notes in 2014.5 Montenegro asserted that the unilateral action of 
Croatia is in violation of the Protocol establishing an interim regime along the southern 
border between the two States in 2002, which, in its Preamble’s fourth paragraph, reads: 
“Departing from principles of respect for reciprocal obligations, non-acceptability of 
unilateral acts and bona fide implementation of the Protocol”; and it is in violation of 
the UNCLOS Preamble’s first paragraph which underlines that the Contracting States 
are “prompt by the desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, 
all issues relating to the law of the sea and aware of the historic significance of this 
Convention as an important contribution of the maintenance of peace, justice and 
progress for all peoples of the world”. Montenegro also stressed that “the Republic of 
Croatia should not establish any valid concessionary contract on exploration and 
exploitation of hydrocarbonates with any company in the world  in disputed territory 
before the definitive delimitation and demarcation of the joint state border with 
Montenegro, or before two states reach a mutually acceptable agreement, based on 
equitable and just instruments that have been already applied in resolving similar 
disputes”.6 
Problems concerning the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas shared deposits 
could also arise between Italy and the States that face it, primarily with Croatia. 
It must be observed that the solution to this problem is not in the UNCLOS. This 
convention only states that “The coastal State exercise over the continental shelf 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources” 
(Art. 77, para. 1).7 Therefore, the solution can only be through bilateral negotiations 
between concerned States. 
                                                           
5
 See Communication from the Government of Montenegro, dated 2 July 2014, concerning exploration 
and exploitation of resources in the Adriatic Sea by the Republic of Croatia; Communication from the 
Government of Montenegro, dated 1 December 2014, concerning exploration and exploitation of 
resources in the Adriatic Sea by the Republic of Croatia. Both documents are available on 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/MNG.htm.  
6
 See Communication from the Government of Montenegro, dated 2 July 2014, concerning exploration 
and exploitation of resources in the Adriatic Sea by the Republic of Croatia, cit. 
7
 The Secretariat of the Commission of International Law in the Memorandum on the Regime of the High 
Seas (UN Doc. A/CN.4/32 (1950), para. 339) proposed “le principe de l'unité du gisement” on the bases 
of which the rules concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf should be supplemented by special 
agreements to take into consideration that the deposits of natural resources does not coincide with the 
limits of the continental shelf. An obligation to cooperate is also affirmed by the United Nations General 
Assembly in resolution 3129 (XXVIII) “Co-operation in the field of the environment concerning natural 
resources shared by two or more States” of 13 December 1973 and in resolution 3281 (XXIX) “Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States” of 17 December 1974. Finally, see UNEP, Draft Principles of 
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The 1968 Agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia concerning the Delimitation of 
the Continental Shelf between the two Countries in the Adriatic Sea includes a provision 
establishing an obligation to cooperate to resolve disputes concerning the exploitation of 
shared resources. Art. 2 states: “In case it is ascertained that natural resources of the sea 
bottom or under the sea bottom extend on both sides of the demarcation line of the 
continental shelf with the consequence that the resources of the shelf belonging to one 
of the contracting parties can be in whole or in part exploited from the part of the shelf 
belonging to the other contracting party, the competent authorities of the contracting 
parties will themselves be in contact with one another with the intention of reaching an 
understanding of the manner in which the aforesaid resources shall be exploited 
previous to consultations by the holders of any eventual concessions”.8 A similar 
provision is contained in the 1979 Agreement between Italy and Greece on the 
delimitation of the continental shelf.9 
Art. 2 found application in the case of the exploitation of the Annamaria gas field, in 
the Northern Adriatic. This field is straddling the demarcation of the continental shelf of 
Italy and Croatia. With a technical agreement,10 the Governments of both countries 
agreed on the programs of gas exploitation signed between the two leaseholders (ENI, 
for Italy, an INA, for Croatia);11 however, they have indicated some conditions for 
applying this arrangement. In particular, the yearly gas exploitation programs shall be 
approved by the competent authorities of both Italy and Croatia; any possible 
suspension of activities imposed by the competent authorities of one side shall be shared 
with the other side; the competent authorities of both sides will jointly approve 
measurement systems on both platforms; the competent authorities of both sides will 
periodically verify the functioning of measurement systems on both platforms and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious 
Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States in Report of the Fifth Session of the 
Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States (UN 
Doc. UNEP/GC.6/17 (1978)) and Cooperation in the field of the environment concerning natural 
resources shared by two or more States, decision 6/14 of the Governing Council of UNEP (19 May 1978) 
(approving the principles). For an analysis on the legal implications of the exploitation of shared natural 
resources, see M. R. MARIO, The Exploitation of Offshore Transboundary Marine Resources or those in 
Disputed Areas: Joint Development Agreements, in A. DEL VECCHIO (ed.), International Law of the Sea. 
Current Trends and Controversial Issues, The Hague, 2014, 281-316. 
8
 Art. 3 of the 1968 Agreement highlights that in case of controversy concerning the position of any 
installation or equipment with reference to the line of demarcation of the continental shelf, the competent 
authorities of the contracting parties shall determine by mutual agreement in which part of the continental 
shelf such installations or equipment may be actually situated. 
9
 Art. 2 of the 1979 Agreement: « Si un gisement de substance minérale, y compris les sables et graviers, 
est partagé par la ligne de séparation, et si la part du gisement qui est située d’un des côtés de la ligne de 
séparation est exploitable en tout ou en partie à partir d’installations situées de l’autre côté de celle-ci, 
les deux Gouvernements chercheront, en liaison avec les titulaires des titres miniers, s’il y en a, à se 
mettre d’accord sur les conditions de mise en exploitation du gisement, afin que cette exploitation soit la 
plus rentable possible et de telle sorte que chacune des Parties conserve l’ensemble de ses droits sur les 
ressources minérales du sol et du sous-sol de son plateau continental. / Dans le cas où auraient été 
exploitées des ressources naturelles d’un gisement situé d’un côté et de l’autre de la ligne de séparation, 
les Parties contractantes mettront tout en œuvre, après avoir consulté les titulaires de titres 
d’exploitation, s’il y en a, afin de parvenir à un accord sur une indemnisation équitable ». 
10
 Technical Agreement between the Ministry of Economic Development of the Italian Republic 
(Directorate General for Energy and Mineral Resources) and the Ministry of Economy, Labour and 
Entrepreneurship of the Republic of Croatia (Directorate for Mining) on the Joint Exploitation of the 
Annamaria Gas Field in the Adriatic Sea, 1 July 2009. 
11
 Annamaria Integrated Development and Operating Agreement, 19 December 2006. 
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certify every three months production and withdrawal from both platforms in cross-
examination of ENI and INA. Finally, the two Governments have expected that 
modifications of the allocation of reserves and compensation plans on past production 
shall be approved by the Ministry of Economic Development of the Italian Republic and 
by the Ministry of Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship of the Republic of Croatia, 
each side referencing in its own acts the quantities to be compensated for past years. 
However, Art. 2 of the 1968 Agreement establishes a basic cooperation mechanism, 
as the Annamaria gas field case shows; success in bilateral cooperation is based, de 
facto, on an arrangement between companies that have exploitation licenses for that 
deposit. 
Rather, it must be emphasized that, in practice, the bilateral agreements between 
States that have the same problem of shared resources in the Persian Gulf, the North 
Sea, the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico lay down rules more detailed which will 
condition the conclusion of an agreement between the companies that have exploitation 
licenses. 
In particular, the US-Mexixo Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, signed in 
2012, facilitates the formation of voluntary arrangements – “unitization agreements” – 
between U.S. leaseholders and Petróleos Mexicanos for the joint exploration and 
development of transboundary reservoirs. It also provides appropriate incentives to 
encourage the formation of such arrangements if a reservoir is proven to be 
transboundary and a unitization agreement is not formed. The agreement also provides 
that development may proceed in an equitable manner that protects each nation’s 
interests. Finally, the agreement provides for ongoing cooperation between the two 
Governments related to safety and the environment, and also provides for joint 
inspection teams to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Both 
Governments will review and approve all unitization agreements governing the 
exploration and development of transboundary reservoirs under the agreement, 
providing for approval of all safety and environmental measures.  
The US-Mexico Agreement “can potentially generate the same normative impact as 
the 1945 Truman proclamation on the continental shelf”;12 and it can certainly be a 
model to apply in Adriatic and Ionian region.  
                                                           
12
 M. H. LOJA, Who Owns the Oil that Traverses a Boundary on the Continental shelf in an Enclosed Sea? 
Seeking Answers in Natural Law through Grotius and Selden, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 
2014, 839-911, 909. 
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OFFSHORE HYDROCARBONS POLITICS AND  
POLICY IN THE ADRIATIC AND IONIAN REGION 
 
ANDREA PRONTERA 
 
 
SUMMARY – 1. Introduction. – 2. Offshore Oil and Gas Activities and Perspectives in the Adriatic and 
Ionian Region. – 3. The International Offshore Politics in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. – 4. National 
Offshore Policy in the Adriatic and Ionian Region: Historical Background and Recent Developments. 
– 5. Conclusion. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, energy security has become a prominent issue on the European 
Union (EU) energy policy agenda. The attention for this new ‘old’ issue has been 
mainly driven by the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine at the end of the 2000s and 
by the growing tension between Russia and EU after the outbreak of war in Eastern 
Ukraine in 2014. The Adriatic and Ionian region is a very important area for the energy 
security strategy of the entire EU, especially with regard to the diversification of gas 
supply (e.g. the development of the Southern Gas Corridor), the completion of the wider 
European energy market (e.g. Energy Community), and the increase in sustainable 
production of fossil fuels, owing to the hydrocarbon reserves located in the Adriatic and 
Ionian Seas. In particular, after the global financial crisis and the economic downturn in 
Southern Europe, many countries of the Adriatic and Ionian region, such as Italy, 
Greece, Croatia and Montenegro, have formulated new plans for the exploration and 
exploitation of their offshore petroleum resources as a strategy to reduce their energy 
dependence but also to boost economic recovery by attracting foreign investments and 
by exploiting oil and gas rent. These policies are coherent with the new ‘EU Energy 
Security Strategy’ and have emphasized the importance of increasing the EU energy 
production from fossils fuels in the next few years.1 However, the relaunch of the 
offshore hydrocarbon sector in the region is also driven by an intra-regional competitive 
dynamic; that is, once a country starts to elaborate a new plan to exploit its resources, 
other countries which share a common marine border tend to be pushed to accelerate or 
review their plan in order to preserve their own resources.  
In the next section, some basic data about the current oil and gas offshore activities 
and their future potential in the EU and the Adriatic and Ionian region are presented. 
Then, the paper focuses on the international dimension of offshore hydrocarbon politics 
and on recent developments at the national level in the main countries of the region: 
Italy, Croatia, Greece, Albania and Montenegro. In particular, with regard to the 
international dimension, attention will be paid to the emerging pattern of bilateral 
diplomacy related to government-to-government negotiations, cooperation or conflicts 
                                                 
1
 See the European Energy Security Strategy, Final Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council, COM (2014) 330 final, 28 May 2014.  
ANDREA PRONTERA 6
for the delimitation of the continental shelf of each state. For the national level, a brief 
case-by-case overview of the historical origins and recent developments in the 
hydrocarbon and offshore sector will be provided. Finally, in the conclusion, the paper 
reviews the main findings and specifies the main drivers behind the current relaunch of 
offshore activities in the Adriatic and Ionian region, along with the resulting patterns of 
cooperation and/or competition among national governments.  
 
 
2. Offshore Oil and Gas Activities and Perspectives in the Adriatic and Ionian 
Region 
 
Offshore hydrocarbon production represents an important indigenous energy source 
for the European Union, especially with regard to natural gas. In 2012, the offshore 
crude oil production of the EU-28 corresponded to almost 9% of the gross petroleum 
products consumption, whereas EU-28 offshore gas production covered 13.8% of the 
gross energy consumption. With regard to crude oil, most of production is located in the 
North Sea, with the UK as the major contributor (75%), followed by Denmark (18%). 
Other important producers are Germany (2.10%), Romania (1.41%), The Netherlands 
(1.33%), Italy (0.83%), Poland (0.33%), Spain (0.25%), Greece (0.17%) and Bulgaria 
(0.02%).2 With regard to gas, the UK and the Netherlands have a crucial role, with 
54.6% and 25.23% of production, respectively. Other important producers are Italy 
(8.06%), Denmark (7.12%), Romania (2.76%), Croatia (1.59%), Ireland (0.29%), 
Bulgaria (0.25%), Spain (0.08%) and Greece (0.01%).  
 
Table 1. EU Main Oil and Gas Offshore Producers (% of Total EU Production). 
Country Oil %  Country Gas % 
UK 75.3 UK 54.6 
Denmark 18.1 Netherlands 25.2 
Germany 2.1 Italy 8.06 
Romania 1.4 Denmark 7.12 
Netherlands 1.33 Romania 2.76 
Italy 0.83 Croatia 1.59 
Poland 0.33 Ireland 0.29 
Spain 0.25 Bulgaria 0.24 
Greece 0.17 Greece 0.01 
Source: EU Offshore Authorities Group  
(http://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/node/63). 
 
With regard to offshore installations, more than 600 platforms (not counting the large 
number of subsea structures connected to them) are operating in the continental shelves 
of the European member states. The North Sea is the area with the highest concentration 
                                                 
2
 Additional, considerable quantities of oil were extracted from the continental shelf of Norway. In 2012 
offshore oil production in Norway was almost 78 million tons, more than 130% of the total European 
offshore oil production (http://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/node/63). 
OFFSHORE HYDROCARBONS POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE ADRIATIC AND IONIAN REGION 7
of hydrocarbon offshore activities, which take place in the Danish, Dutch, German, 
Irish, Norwegian and UK sections. However, the Adriatic and Ionian Sea basins 
represent the second area for hydrocarbon installations, mainly due to the offshore 
production that is taking place in the Italian continental shelf as well as in Croatia and 
Greece (figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Offshore Installations (Oil and Gas) 
 in the EU and in the Adriatic-Ionian Region (Red Circle).  
 
Source: EU Offshore Authorities Group  
(http://euoag.jrc.ec.europa.eu/node/63). 
 
According to the data on proven hydrocarbon reserves (both onshore and offshore), 
the potential of the Adriatic and Ionian region in a wider European perspective is not 
impressive: proven oil reserves represent about 6.5% of the entire European continent 
(EU member states plus Norway), whereas proven gas reserves account for about 2.1% 
of the total (table 2).  
 
Table 2. Adriatic-Ionian Region (AI) Proven Oil (Billion Barrels) 
 and Gas (Trillion Cubic Feet) Reserves by Country. 
Country Oil (Bb) Gas (Tcf) 
Italy 0.52 2.20 
Croatia 0.07 0.88 
Greece 0.01 0.04 
Albania 0.17 0.03 
Montenegro 0 0 
Slovenia 0 0 
Tot. Adriatic-Ionian region (AI) 0.77 3.15 
Tot. EU (+Norway) 12 146 
%AI/EU(+Norway) 6.4% 2.1% 
Sources: U. S. Energy Information Administration statistics, 2013  
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(http://www.eia.gov). 
 
However, these resources can play an important role from a regional perspective. 
The most promising countries in terms of hydrocarbons development seem to be Italy 
and Croatia, followed by Albania for oil and Greece for gas reserves. In particular, Italy 
is the country with the most significant gas reserves of the region, and more than the 
half of these reserves are located in the Adriatic Sea3 (table 3). 
 
Table 3. Italian Offshore Gas Reserves per Marine Zones.  
Source: DGRME (2014). 
 Gas (million cubic meters) 
Marine zone Proven 
reserves 
Probable 
reserves 
Possible reserves % Proven 
reserves 
Zone A 25.926 18.679 7.981 44% 
Zone B 4.444 6.30 1.290 7% 
Zone C+D+F+G 5.389 13.210 2.445 9% 
Tot Sea 35.758 38.250 11.717 60% 
Tot Italy 59.425 63.382 21.684 100% 
Note: Zone A and Zone B correspond to the Italian sections of the Northern Adriatic Sea. 
 
Moreover, these data are incomplete, since apart from the Italian section, many 
portions of the continental shelves of the region have not been yet explored, and 
extensive data are lacking for several areas. Additionally, in the next few years, 
according to the recent plans formulated by the governments of the EU (Croatia and 
Greece) and non-EU countries (Montenegro and Albania) in the region, the offshore 
activities in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas are expected to increase (figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Marine zones open to offshore exploration and production activities  
in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas. 
  
Sources: Mappa Infield-2013. Data DGRME (2014). 
                                                 
3
 Data for table 3 and figure 2 are from ‘Lo sfruttamento sostenibile selle risorse minerarie del mare’, 
Direzione generale per le risorse minerarie ed energetiche, 2014 (DGRME 2014). 
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3. The International Offshore Politics in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas 
 
Offshore oil and gas activities in the countries of the Adriatic and Ionian Sea basins 
take place in their territorial sea and off the continental shelf. Sovereignty over these 
areas is established pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), which provides a legal framework for its Contracting States for sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction concerning their territorial seas, continental shelves, and 
eventually, exclusive economic zones. This legal framework covers, among other 
things, a Contracting state’s rights to natural resources in those three areas (none of the 
countries in the region have established exclusive economic zones), its right to exercise 
jurisdiction over them, controls to protect and preserve the marine environment in them, 
and claims for compensation. All the states of the Adriatic and Ionian region became 
parties to the UNCLOS during the 1990s and the 2000s4 (table 4).  
 
Table 4. UNCLOS Parties in the Adriatic and Ionian Region. 
Country UNCLOS 
Croatia 1995 
Greece 1995 
Italy 1995 
Slovenia 1995 
Albania 2003 
Montenegro 2006 
 
However, the regime of bilateral agreements to delimitate each state’s continental 
shelf date back to the 1960s.5 In particular, since the end of the 1960s, the Italian 
government has negotiated different agreements with the other states of the region in 
order to improve the development of its offshore hydrocarbon resources.6 In 1968, an 
agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia was signed7 (and later Croatia, Montenegro 
and Slovenia would become successor states of Yugoslavia in this agreement). Then, an 
agreement between Italy and Greece was finalized in 1977, and Italy and Albania 
negotiated an agreement in 1992.8  
With the Albania-Italy continental shelf agreement of 1992, the process of 
delimitation between the Adriatic’s opposite coasts was virtually completed. However, 
in the following years, with the breakup of the former Republic of Yugoslavia, the 
emergence of four new Adriatic littoral states, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, 
                                                 
4
 See, Current status of the ratification/accession of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm). 
5
 For a detailed account of the bilateral agreements in the Adriatic regions from the 1960s to the 1990s, 
see Gerald Blake and Duško Topalović, The Maritime Boundaries of the Adriatic Sea, International 
Boundaries Research Unit, Maritime Briefing, Vol. 1, No. 8, 1996. 
6
 Italy has also negotiated agreement with many other States of the Mediterranean Sea (e.g. France, Spain, 
and Tunisia). 
7
 Agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between 
the two Countries in the Adriatic Sea, 8 January 1968. 
8
 Accord entre la République Italienne et la République de Grèce sur la Délimitation des zones du 
plateau continental propres a chacun des deux états, 24 May 1977; Agreement between Albania and Italy 
for the determination of the continental shelf of each of the two countries, 18 December 1992. 
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Montenegro and Slovenia, significantly complicated the maritime boundary delimitation 
picture in the region. With regard to the Italian marine border, the problems were easily 
solved after Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia became successor states of Yugoslavia 
in the 1968 agreement. In 2005, a new agreement between Italy and Croatia was also 
signed in order to facilitate the common development of a gas field located between the 
Italian and Croatian continental shelves9 (the Annamaria gas field). According to this 
framework, in 2009, Italy and Croatia signed a technical agreement for the joint 
exploitation of this gas field10 (this agreement was renewed in 2013).  
With regard to the new Balkan countries, the situation has been more complicated, 
and the recent Croatian plan to develop its offshore resources – according to which the 
Croatian government has opened twenty-nine offshore blocks in the Adriatic Sea to 
exploration and exploitation (see the next section) – has prompted new issues with both 
Montenegro and Slovenia. A definitive agreement for the common delimitation of the 
state border at sea among these countries has not yet been concluded. In particular, an 
‘interim regime’ has been at work between Croatia and Montenegro since 2002.11 
However, the government of Montenegro has expressed concern about the Croatian 
offshore plan. In 2014, the Montenegrin Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially filed a 
complaint against Croatia arguing for the inclusion of the Prevlaka peninsula in the 
government-issued geographic maps that are offered to interested concessionaires for 
oil and gas exploration.12  
With regard to the sea border between Croatia and Slovenia, an agreement was first 
negotiated in 2001, but the resulting treaty was not signed by the Croatian 
government.13 In the period between 2002 and 2008, no substantive negotiations took 
place, but the two governments agreed to resolve the dispute with the assistance of a 
third party. Accordingly, in 2009, an arbitration agreement was signed, but the process 
has not yet been concluded (the arbitral award should be final by 2015).14 In this 
context, the Croatian offshore plan has prompted a reaction from the Slovenian 
government and could jeopardize the solution of the dispute.15  
After two years of negotiations, an agreement was also signed in 2009 between 
Greece and Albania. In particular, the deal was reached in April 2009 during a high-
profile meeting between visiting Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis and his 
                                                 
9
 Correzione tecnica della linea di delimitazione Italia-Croazia, Comunicato Ministeriale 30 settembre 
2005, Rome.  
10
 Technical Agreement between the Ministry of Economic Development of the Italian Republic 
(Directorate General for Energy and Mineral Resources) and the Ministry of Economy, Labour and 
Entrepreneurship of the Republic of Croatia (Directorate for Mining) on the Joint Exploitation of the 
Annamaria Gas Field in the Adriatic Sea, 1 June 2009. 
11
 Protocol between the Government of Croatia and the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, 10 December 2002, establishing a provisional cross-border regime on the Prevlaka 
peninsula.  
12
 Montenegro recalled that the Protocol on the Provisional Regime of 2002 obliges the two countries to 
refrain themselves from unilateral actions that would prejudice the decision of the common border at sea 
and on land. Accordingly for the Montenegrin government, the unilateral acts from Croatia calling public 
tenders in the southern part of the Adriatic is inconsistent with the Protocol (see, ‘Montenegro objects on 
Croatian tender for oil and gas exploitation’, 4 April 2014, at http://www.balkaneu.com/montenegro-
objects-croatian-tender-oil-gas-exploitation/). 
13
 Treaty Between the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croatia on the Common State Border, 
2001. 
14
 See http://www.vlada.si/en/projects/arbitration/#c10819. 
15
 See ‘Slovenia Fears Croatia's Bidding Round Launch Would Jeopardize Maritime Dispute’, 17 April 
2014 (http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/croatia-slovenia-maritime-dispute). 
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Albanian counterpart, Sali Berisha. However, the signing of the agreement was 
followed by different statements made in the national media by Albanian military and 
international law experts, who claimed that the agreement had been subject to 
irregularity and abusive border delimitation. Following these public statements, the 
issue was addressed by the Albanian Constitutional Court, which nullified the 
agreement due to ‘procedural and substantial violations’ of the constitution and the UN 
Convention of the Law of the Sea.16  
In summary, as far as the situation of the maritime border delimitation in the Adriatic 
and Ionian region is concerned, Italy is the only country that has signed international 
agreement with all the relevant parties. Moreover, technical cooperation between Italy 
and Croatia has been established for the joint development of some gas fields in the 
Adriatic Sea (table 5). Unresolved issues still remain between Croatia and Slovenia, 
Croatia and Montenegro, and Greece and Albania, whereas the marine border between 
Montenegro and Albania has not yet been defined (table 5).  
 
Table 5. Maritime Border Delimitation Agreements/Issues in the Adriatic and Ionian Region (2014). 
 Italy Croatia Greece Albania Montenegro Slovenia 
Italy  IA/TA IA IA IA IA 
Croatia IA/TA    IR/U* U* 
Greece IA   U*   
Albania IA  U*  No  
Montenegro IA IR/U*  No   
Slovenia IA U*     
Note: IA = intergovernmental agreement; TA = technical agreement; IR = interim regime; U* = unresolved issues; 
No = marine border/no agreement; Orange square = no marine border. 
 
 
4. National Offshore Policy in the Adriatic and Ionian Region: Historical 
Background and Recent Developments  
 
Italy  
Offshore activities in the Italian territorial sea and continental shelf date back to the 
1950s, when the first oil wells were drilled off the coast of Sicily and the first gas was 
found in the Northern Adriatic Sea by the state-owned companies Agip and ENI.  
In 1957, a new public agency was established to promote the development of 
national resources and to manage the sector, the UNMI (Ufficio Nazionale Minerario 
Idrocarburi), which later became UNMIG (Ufficio Nazionale Minerario per gli 
Idrocarburi e la Geotermia) under the DGERM (Direzione Generale per le Risorse 
Minerarie ed Energetiche) of the Ministry of Economic Development. In 1967, the 
legislative framework for offshore activities was set up with Law No. 613, which 
defined the regime for exploration and exploitation of offshore resources and which 
identified the marine areas open for such activities. In particular, Law No. 613 defined 
                                                 
16
 See ‘Albanian constitutional court nullifies maritime boundary agreement with Greece’, 10 February 
2010 (https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news/?itemno=9534). 
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five marine areas (so-called ‘zone marine’) A, B, C, D and E, in which offshore 
activities should have been developed by operators after obtaining a concession from 
the Ministry of Economic Development17 (the so called ‘titoli minerari’). In the 
following years, others marine areas were opened to offshore activities, including zone 
F in 1975 (with the Ministerial Decree 13/06/75) and zone G in 1981 (with Ministerial 
Decree 26/06/81).  
Until the 1980s, offshore activities increased, but different factors at the end of the 
decade reversed this trend.18 At the beginning of the 1990s, various measures were 
enacted by the government to comply with EU requirements and to relaunch the sector. 
In 1996, with the Legislative Decree no. 625, Italy applied directive 94/22/CE, which 
opened the sector to competition and reviewed the annual fees for concession and the 
royalties regime. It also provided a distribution of the royalties between the state and the 
sub-national governments, that is, municipalities and regions.19  
Despite the new legislative framework, offshore activities continued to decrease in 
the 1990s and 2000s. During the 2000s, other changes in the royalties regime were 
enacted, and new procedures to hasten the authorization processes for granting the 
license for exploration and exploitation were established. Nevertheless, the new 
measures did not reverse the trend, and offshore activities continued to decrease. At the 
beginning of the 2010s, in response to the concern created by the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster in the Gulf of Mexico, the government enacted the Legislative Decree 
128/2010, which imposed a ban on research, exploration or exploitation of oil and gas 
in coastal and marine areas protected in any capacity for environmental purposes, as 
well as outside it, in marine areas within twelve miles of the protected areas. Moreover, 
Legislative Decree 128/2010 provided the same prohibition, applicable only to liquid 
hydrocarbons, within five miles from the Italian baselines. This decision was reviewed 
in 2012 with Legislative Decree 83/2012, according to which the ban established with 
the previous decree was applied only for new requests (i.e. according to the new law, 
continuing hydrocarbon exploration and production activities is allowed in areas located 
within twelve nautical miles for concessions and ongoing authorization procedures at 
the date of enforcement of Legislative Decree 128/10). However, the Legislative Decree 
83/2012 extended the ban on hydrocarbon research, exploration and exploitation within 
the twelve miles to the entire national coastal perimeter. In accordance to this measure, 
the Minister of Economic Development, with a Ministerial Decree issued on 9 August 
2013, redefined the Italian marine areas open for hydrocarbon activities. As a result, the 
total extension of the Italian marine zones open to such activities was reduced from 227, 
160 to 139,656 square kilometres (figure 3).   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 The Italian concession regime was originally structured into three different type of licenses: a 
‘prospecting permit’, an ‘exploration license’ and a ‘production license’. This regime has been recently 
reviewed with Law No. 164 of 11 November 2014. 
18
 L’upstream petrolifero in Italia: normative, stato e prospettive, Direzione Generale per l’Energia e le 
Risorse Minerarie, Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico, Rome, 2008. 
19
 In particular, with regard to offshore activities located in the Italian territorial sea (within 12 miles) 
royalties are to be given to the Regions, whereas for the oil or gas fields located in the Italian continental 
shelf they are entirely at disposal of the State. 
OFFSHORE HYDROCARBONS POLITICS AND POLICY IN THE ADRIATIC AND IONIAN REGION 13 
 
Figure 3. Italian Marine Zones Open to Hydrocarbon Activities.  
Pre-2013 (Left) and Post-2013 (Right). 
 
Source: Ministerial Decree 9 August 2013 (Annexes C and D). 
 
In 2013, with the National Energy Strategy (‘Strategia Energetica Nazionale’, SEN), 
the Italian government decided again to take action to improve domestic hydrocarbon 
production, both onshore and offshore, in order to enhance its energy security, reduce 
its dependence on foreign countries, and to boost economic growth.20 The SEN also set 
very ambitious targets for oil and gas national production by 2020 (+ 46% for gas and + 
148% for oil starting from the quotas of 2011). Moreover, to support domestic 
hydrocarbon development, the government proposed to reform the concession regime 
by providing a single concession instead of two separate concessions (one for 
exploration and one for production) and by recentralizing the decision-making 
processes on onshore activities to overcome regional and local opposition. Accordingly, 
on 13 September 2014, the new Italian government of Matteo Renzi enacted the so-
called ‘Unlock Italy’ (Sblocca Italia) Law (Law Decree of 12 September 2014, 
No.133), which introduced some relevant changes into upstream sector governance.21 In 
particular, with regard to the provisions which also affect the offshore sector, the new 
law introduced a ‘Sole Concession’ (Titolo Concessorio Unico), which includes both 
exploration and production activities, and it established that the procedure for the award 
of the Sole Concession must be completed within 180 days. Moreover, the new law 
provided for the issuance of temporary experimental concessions designed to last five 
years in the Gulf of Venice in the Northern Adriatic Sea, in order to ‘preserve the 
national resources of hydrocarbons located in the sea and in the continental shelf in 
areas in the vicinity of the areas of other coastal countries which are undergoing 
                                                 
20
 See Strategia Energetica Nazionale, Inter-Ministerial Decree 8 March 2013. 
21
 The Decree ‘Unlock Italy’ has been converted into Law No. 164 of 11 November 2014. However, the 
new Law has raised many concerns and protests from the Italian Regions, since it produces a 
recentralization of the decision-making process concerning upstream activities. Currently six Italian 
Regions (Abruzzo, Campania, Lombardia, Marche, Puglia, and Veneto) have appealed to the 
Constitutional Court against the articles 37 and 38 of the Law Decree of 12 September 2014, No.133. 
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exploration and production activities’.22 This measure was intended in particular to 
respond to the new offshore Croatian plan and to preserve the Italian resources at the 
marine border between the two countries.23 Finally, the new law assigned to the 
Ministry of Economic Development in cooperation with the Ministry of the 
Environment (and with the Italian Regions for onshore activities) the task to elaborate a 
plan to identify the areas in which exploration and production activities will be allowed 
in the next few years.  
 
Greece 
Hydrocarbon exploration activities in Greece began during the 1960s and have been 
conducted both by private companies and the Ministry of Industry. The first 
hydrocarbon resources were discovered in the offshore area of the Isle of Thasos by the 
company Oceanic. These discoveries stimulated the government to create a state-owned 
company (DEP) in 1975 to promote hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation. In 1976, 
the government also enacted the first comprehensive legislative framework for the 
exploration and development of hydrocarbons (Law No. 468). Then, in 1985, the 
government created another state-owned company, the DEP EKY (a subsidiary of 
DEP), to improve upstream activities and to manage the concession for exploration and 
exploitations in the hands of private companies. Subsequently, the government granted 
about twenty-four areas, both onshore and offshore, to the two state-owned companies 
to develop the country’s domestic resources. In 1995, the legislative framework 
changed with the transposition at the national level of the directive 94/22/EC with Law 
No. 2289, which opened the sector to competition. In 1996, the government launched 
the first international licensing round to grant new concessions for exploration and 
exploitation in six areas onshore and offshore in the Patraikos Gulf in the Ionian Sea. 
However, the research activities did not produce the expected results, and in practice, 
they were terminated by the beginning of the 2000s. The first efforts to relaunch the 
sector traces back to the 2007, when the government took over the concessions that 
were previously granted to the state-owned companies DEP and DEP EKY. Since the 
explosion of the debt crisis in 2009–2010, this strategy has been improved. In particular, 
with Law No. 4001, the legislative framework for granting the rights over exploration 
and exploitation was modified in 2011 in order to attract international companies. 
According to Law 4001/2011, a new public agency was established (the Hellenic 
Hydrocarbons Management Company, HHRM SA) to manage the relationship between 
the government and the companies involved in upstream activities. Moreover, with the 
new law, three different procedures could be used by the HHRM SA to grant the right 
of hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation on behalf of the state: 1) an invitation to 
tender for specific areas previously approved by the competent Greek authority (the 
Minister of Environment, Energy and Climate Change); 2) a submission of an 
application by an interested entity for areas that have not been yet defined (and that then 
have to be approved by the Minister of Environment, Energy and Climate Change) and 
3); an open invitation (open door) for the expression of interest when the area for which 
the concession is requested is available on a permanent basis or has been the subject of 
                                                 
22
 Law Decree of 12 September 2014, No.133, art. 38, para. 10.  
23
 See, for example, the statement of Simona Vicari, Italian undersecretary for economic development: 
‘We cannot ignore that other Adriatic and Mediterranean riparian countries are acting with resolution to 
valorise their undersea resources’ (www.eiranews.com/index.php/en/past-issues/37-volume-2-issue-
12/220-adriatic-hydrocarbon-triangle-is-in-low-intensity-mess). 
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a previous procedure which has not resulted in the conclusion of a lease agreement or a 
production sharing agreement or has been abandoned by a contractor. Currently the 
Greek government has launched its second international licensing round (‘Call for 
Tenders for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons in Greece’) for twenty 
marine areas (blocks), eleven in the Ionian Sea and nine in the offshore area south of 
Crete, and an open-door invitation for two offshore areas in the Patraikos Gulf and 
Katakolo.24 
 
Croatia 
Since the 1960s, hydrocarbons exploration and exploitation activities in Croatia have 
been realized by the state-owned company INA. In 1993, INA became a public 
company, and since 2003, it has been progressively privatized. In this period, Croatian 
energy policy focused on the liberalization and privatization of the energy sector, and 
the country gradually adopted the EU legislative energy framework. However, INA is 
still, currently, the only hydrocarbon producer in the country, running different onshore 
oil fields and five offshore gas fields located in the Northern Adriatic Sea in a joint 
venture with the Italian ENI. The first attempt by the Croatian government to relaunch 
hydrocarbon production was sketched in the policy document ‘Energy Strategy of the 
Republic of Croatia’ issued in 2009’.25 However, only after 2012, the new Croatian 
government decisively began to develop a strategy to improve exploration and 
exploitation activities. In the wake of the Ukraine-Russia energy crisis, the government 
also decided to improve its gas supply security by promoting new infrastructure 
projects, the Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline and an LNG facility near the Island of Krk. In 
2013, the government combined the three projects (pipeline, LNG and hydrocarbon 
development), with the idea of making Croatia an important ‘energy hub’ for the energy 
security of the EU. With regard to offshore activities, in 2013, the government assigned 
the task of conducting a seismic acquisition survey of offshore Croatia to the Spectrum 
company, as a precursor to the offshore licensing round that the government planned to 
hold in the following years. In 2013, a new regulatory framework was also enacted in 
order to align Croatian legislation to the EU (Directive 94/22/EC) and to attract foreign 
companies. The new ‘Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons Act’ (Official 
Gazette Nos. 94/13 and 14/14) introduced an Exploration and Production Sharing 
Agreement or a Tax and Royalty Agreement model for the upstream Croatian sector and 
established a new public agency, the Croatian Hydrocarbons Agency, to manage the 
licensing rounds and to help the Ministry of the Economy to administrate the sector. 
Finally, in 2014, the government defined twenty-nine offshore blocks in the Croatian 
section of the Adriatic Sea (eight blocks in the Northern Adriatic and twenty-one in the 
Middle and South Adriatic), and in April, it launched its first ‘Offshore round for 
licences for the exploration and production of hydrocarbons’.26 
 
Albania 
Albania has been a hydrocarbon producer since the 1950s–60s, and oil has especially 
been an important source of revenue for the state since that period. However, since the 
1990s, the activities in the area of exploration and exploitation have been performed by 
                                                 
24
 See http://www.ypeka.gr/Default.aspx?tabid=765&language=en-US.  
25
 See Energy Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship, 
Zagreb, June 2009. 
26
 See http://www.azu.hr/en-us/1st-Offshore-License-Round. 
ANDREA PRONTERA 16
a state-owned company, Albpetrol. At the beginning of the 1990s, the government 
began to open the hydrocarbon sector to international companies, and the first 
competitive bidding to conclude production sharing agreements for onshore and 
offshore areas were organized. In particular, with regard to offshore activities, the first 
international bidding took place in 1990–91 after the Albanian territorial sea and its 
continental shelf was divided into five areas that had been unexplored until then. As a 
result of the bidding, five production sharing agreements were finalized, and in the 
subsequent years, other international bids were organized for onshore sections of the 
Albanian territory. In the meanwhile, the main legislation for hydrocarbon exploration 
and exploitation was reviewed in order to attract foreign companies, albeit the state-
owned company Albpetrol continued to play a crucial role in the governance of the 
sector. In particular, in 1993, the government enacted Law 7746/93 (Petroleum Law on 
Exploration and Production), which was modified in 1994 (Law 7853/94 and Law 
7811/94) in accordance to the directive 94/22/EC. However, according to this law, 
Albpetrol was in charge of the management of the Albanian hydrocarbon sector. 
Moreover, the law granted the right to explore new areas in Albanian territory to 
Albpetrol. This organizational structure was modified in 2006, when a new public 
agency, the National Agency of Natural Resources (AKBN), was established to manage 
the relationships between the government and the companies involved in the 
hydrocarbon sector, including Albpetrol. In particular, since 2006, AKBN has taken the 
responsibility to operate the production sharing agreement on behalf of the Albanian 
government and to support the exploration of additional areas in the Albanian territory. 
Currently, some areas have still to be assigned, especially onshore (nine areas), whereas 
the only offshore block to be assigned is the ‘Rodoni North’ block at the marine border 
between Albania and Montenegro.27 Moreover, in order to open the sector to 
competition and to continue to attract foreign companies, the government has also 
sought to privatize Albpetrol since 2011. Though the first attempt to privatize the 
company failed, a new plan of privatization was issued by the government in 2014.  
 
Montenegro 
Montenegro is not a hydrocarbon producer country. During the 1960s and the 1970s, 
some activities in the field of exploration were carried out by the state-owned company 
‘Jugopetrol Kotor’ in cooperation with foreign companies, but no important discoveries 
of hydrocarbons were realized. After its independence in 2006, Montenegro started to 
reform its energy sector and to harmonize its laws and standards according to the EU 
energy policy (in 2005, Montenegro joined the Energy Community). Since 2006, the 
economy of Montenegro has experienced progress, and it has continued to grow despite 
the global financial crisis of the late 2010s. However, the country is heavily dependent 
on tourism and refined aluminium. Imports account for most of its energy requirements, 
so the development of hydrocarbon resources through exploration of Montenegrin 
offshore reserves represents an important addition to the national economy. In 2011, the 
government of Montenegro formulated a comprehensive energy strategy, which 
explicitly stated that part of the government energy policy should be based on the 
exploitation of domestic hydrocarbon resources and on improvement in the security of 
supplies in the gas sector.28 In 2010–2011, two laws were enacted by the government to 
establish a new legislative framework in line with the directive 94/22/CE (‘Law on 
                                                 
27
 See http://www.akbn.gov.al/index.php/en/hydrocarbon/opportunities-for-exploration. 
28
 See Energy Policy of Montenegro until 2030, Podgorica, February 2011. 
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Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons’, No. 41/10 of 23 July 2010, 40/11 of 8 
August 2011). Then, in 2012–13, thirteen offshore blocks were defined in the Adriatic 
Sea, and an international bidding round was launched to assign the concessions for 
exploration and exploitation in these areas. Finally, the government recently manifested 
its intention to proceed with additional international bidding rounds in 2015 and 2016.29  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The development of offshore hydrocarbons politics and policy in the Adriatic and 
Ionian region can be divided into three main periods. In the first period, from about the 
1960s to the beginning of the 1990s, the basic legislative framework and the bilateral 
international regime of the sector were established. In particular, at the national level, 
the offshore sector was basically organized around the main state-owned companies (or 
‘national champion’), which managed the sector along with the respective minister 
responsible for economic development or industry – obviously with a difference among 
the Italian and the Greek cases and the Yugoslavian and Albanian cases, with the latter 
two countries being less open to foreign companies. With regard to the delimitation of 
the continental shelf for the exploration and production of hydrocarbon resources, Italy 
– the major producer country – took the lead in negotiating and defining its sea border 
with respect to Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania. In this period, no serious disputes were 
open which could have blocked or undermined the national plans for offshore 
hydrocarbon development. The second period, from the beginning of the 1990s to the 
end of the 2010s, was characterized by two different trends: homogenization and 
fragmentation. On one hand, on the national level, the sector was progressively opened 
to competition and harmonized, also due to the implementation of the directive 
94/22/EC. Additionally, countries such as Greece and Albania realized their first 
international bidding round. On the other hand, the international regime for the 
delimitation of the marine borders was complicated by the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
Among the new Balkan countries, especially, disputes emerged, and Albania and 
Greece were also not able to conclude a definitive agreement. Finally, in the most recent 
period (since 2008–2009), there has been a relaunch of offshore activities, mainly 
driven by three factors: the economic crisis, the concern about the security of supply 
(especially in the gas sector) and intra-regional competition. The relaunch of national 
plans for offshore development have also created further tensions among the Balkan 
countries, in particular between Croatia, Montenegro and Slovenia.  
 
 
  
                                                 
29
 See http://www.petroleum.me/index.php?jezik=eng. 
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1. European Union Initiatives in the Energy Sector 
 
It is well known that, as the world’s largest importer of energy, the European Union 
has always had a high level of energy dependence, and a low production rate. 
The existing imbalance between (insufficient) energy production and the need for 
energy supply, in addition to the absence of an international organization entrusted with 
global governance of energy, led the European Union (at that time, the European 
Community) to become an important actor in the energy field. Since the 1990s, the 
European Union has moved forward on two courses. On the one hand, it has concluded 
bilateral treaties with third party states, principally energy producer states, in order to 
secure access to energy supplies.1 On the other, it has been the promoter of two 
important multilateral treaties aimed at integration of markets in the energy sector. 
This article does not discuss the first of these paths; rather, it will examine the 
external energy policy of the European Union, as driven through multilateral 
instruments of governance: the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the Energy 
Community Treaty (EnCT). The two systems will be analyzed in light of the principles 
which, according to the Commission of the European Union, should inform the internal 
action of the European Union: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and 
coherence.2 The question is whether those principles also inform the European Union’s 
external action, as the importance of those principles has been emphasized in 
reinforcing the role of the European Union in the multilateral system.3 Lastly, this 
article poses some questions relating to the possible interplay between the two systems 
of governance in order to draw some conclusions on the governance of the energy sector 
put in place by the European Union through multilateral treaties. 
 
 
2. The Energy Charter Treaty 
 
                                                           
1
 K. TALUS, EU Energy Law and Policy: A Critical Account, Oxford, 2013, 226-230. 
2
 Commission of the European Union, European Governance - A White Paper, COM(2001) 428 final 
(2001/C 287/01).  
3
 See European Parliament resolution of 11 May 2011 on the EU as a global actor: its role in multilateral 
organisations (2010/2298(INI)) stating that “there is a need to further involve non-state actors in 
multilateral policy-making, to promote and facilitate improved consultation of civil society organisations 
and social partners in the future governance structures of international organisations”. 
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Aimed at establishing “a legal framework in order to promote long-term cooperation 
in the energy field, based on complementarities and mutual benefits, in accordance with 
the objectives and principles of the Charter,” the ECT was born from the ashes of the 
Cold War.4 Putting aside previous economic divisions with Eastern states, the European 
Community became the proponent of an initiative that would have supplied energy to 
European states, thus facilitating Western investment in Eastern European states, rich in 
energy reserves as well as the transit of energy within the European continent.5 
The first step in this direction was a non-binding instrument, the European Energy 
Charter of 1991, which paved the way for the adoption of the Energy Charter Treaty 
within a legally binding foundation. As a result, the ECT rapidly became the most 
important comprehensive multilateral instrument on energy. The ECT does not establish 
a conventional system for the exploitation of energy resources: in accordance with 
international law, it is based on state sovereignty over natural resources, explicitly 
recognizing the right of the contracting parties to determine the territory to be exploited 
and their policies for economic use.6 The ECT’s aim is to provide a “multilateral 
framework for energy cooperation” based on the principles of “open, competitive 
markets and sustainable development”.7 Its key elements are investment protection; 
trade in energy, energy products, and energy related equipment, based on the WTO 
rules; freedom of energy transit; improvement of energy efficiency; international 
dispute settlement, including investor-state arbitration and inter-state arbitration; and 
greater legal transparency.8 Clearly, the need for transparency emerges from Art. 20 
ECT, which aims at ensuring openness of the states parties’ activity in the energy field 
by requiring them to publish laws, regulations and judicial decisions, and to designate 
enquiry points to which requests for information about their energy policies may be 
addressed.9 This provision guarantees public access to state legislation in the energy 
                                                           
4
 Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents: A Legal Framework for 
International Energy Cooperation, Brussels, 2004, Art. 2. 
5
 Cfr. A. Konoplyanik, T. Wälde, Energy Charter Treaty and its Role in International Energy, in Journal 
of Energy & Natural Resources Law, Vol. 24, 2006, p. 524: “Russia and many of the neighbor states of 
the Former Soviet Union (FSU) were rich in energy resources but needed major investments to ensure 
their development, while the states of Western Europe had a strategic interest in diversifying their 
sources of energy supplies to diminish their dependence on the Middle East. There was therefore a 
recognized need to ensure that a commonly accepted foundation was established for developing energy 
cooperation among the states of the Eurasian continent”. 
6
 Art. 18, para. 1, ECT provides that “[t]he Contracting Parties recognize state sovereignty and sovereign 
rights over energy resources. They reaffirm that these must be exercised in accordance with and subject 
to the rules of international law”. 
7
 Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents: A Legal Framework for 
International Energy Cooperation, Brussels, 2004, 13. 
8
 “The ECT has a pioneer role for treaty-based international energy co-operation. It: Is unique in 
covering all forms of international energy co-operation simultaneously, i.e. investment, trade, transit and 
energy efficiency; May create an intermediary step towards WTO membership for those ECT countries 
that are not yet WTO members; Is the first binding multilateral agreement on the promotion and 
protection of foreign investment, covering all important investment issues and providing high standards 
of protection, including a fully developed dispute settlement mechanism; Is the first multilateral treaty on 
energy transit issues and energy efficiency; Establishes a permanent discussion forum between members 
concerning all aspects of international energy co-operation”, Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy 
Charter Treaty A Reader’s Guide, 10.  
9
 Art. 20 ECT reads as follows: “1. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of 
general application which affect trade in Energy Materials and Products are, in accordance with Article 
29(2)(a), among the measures subject to the transparency disciplines of the GATT and relevant Related 
Instruments. 2. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application 
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field, and in particular to the legislative activity of those states parties which, having an 
economy in transition, are usually characterized by clumsy legislation. A secondary but 
equally relevant consequence of Art. 20 is that it encourages coherence of legislation 
and of judicial decisions, ultimately guaranteeing accountability of states parties to the 
ECT for their implementing activity. On the other hand, provisions aimed at 
guaranteeing openness—and thus accountability—of the ECT’s institutions with regard 
to the voting and decision-making process seem to be lacking. 
The ECT’s transparency problems have been raised in relation to two main issues: its 
dispute settlement system and, in particular, the investor-state arbitration mechanisms 
provided by Art. 26 ECT, and the provisional application of the treaty under Art. 45 of 
the text. 
Art. 26 ECT provides investors with various options for seeking redress, including: 
taking host states to international arbitration to resolve complaints about investment 
protection; establishing alternatives among the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes; a sole arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration tribunals established by 
UNCITRAL rules; or arbitral proceedings under the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.10 The issue of transparency in investor-state 
arbitration is a thorny one. It is well known that confidentiality is the general rule in 
investor-state arbitration. Arbitrators and the parties are therefore under an obligation 
not to divulge or release information relating to proceedings. Moreover, awards are 
generally not public. For example, pursuant to UNCITRAL rules, parties are forbidden 
from disclosing awards, unless otherwise stated.11 Analogously, ICSID arbitration rules 
provide that the Centre shall not publish the award without the parties’ consent.12 It is 
not by chance that UNCITRAL has recently adopted its Rules on Transparency in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
made effective by any Contracting Party, and agreements in force between Contracting Parties, which 
affect other matters covered by this Treaty shall also be published promptly in such a manner as to 
enable Contracting Parties and Investors to become acquainted with them. The provisions of this 
paragraph shall not require any Contracting Party to disclose confidential information which would 
impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate 
commercial interests of any Investor. 3. Each Contracting Party shall designate one or more enquiry 
points to which requests for information about the above mentioned laws, regulations, judicial decisions 
and administrative rulings may be addressed and shall communicate promptly such designation to the 
Secretariat which shall make it available on request”. 
10
 Art. 26, para. 4, ECT states that “In the event that an Investor chooses to submit the dispute for 
resolution under subparagraph (2)(c), the Investor shall further provide its consent in writing for the 
dispute to be submitted to: (a) (i) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
established pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States opened for signature at Washington, 18 March 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 
the “ICSID Convention”), if the Contracting Party of the Investor and the Contracting Party party to the 
dispute are both parties to the ICSID Convention; or (ii) The International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, established pursuant to the Convention referred to in subparagraph (a)(i), under the 
rules governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the 
Centre (hereinafter referred to as the “Additional Facility Rules”), if the Contracting Party of the 
Investor or the Contracting Party party to the dispute, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention; 
(b) a sole arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration tribunal established under the Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter referred to as “UNCITRAL”); or (c) an 
arbitral proceeding under the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce”. 
11
 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as revised in 
2010, Art. 34, para. 5, stating that “An award may be made public with the consent of all parties or where 
and to the extent disclosure is required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right or in 
relation to legal proceedings before a court or other competent authority”. 
12
 World Bank, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, Art. 48, para. 5. 
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Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration in order to overcome the problem of lack of 
transparency in investor-state proceedings and the United Nations Convention on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration.13 
With respect to provisional application of the ECT, under Art. 45, para. 3 (b), of the 
treaty, “[i]n the event that a signatory terminates provisional application under 
subparagraph (a), the obligation of the signatory (…) remains in effect with respect to 
those Investments for twenty years following the effective date of termination, except as 
otherwise provided in subparagraph (c)”. This provision, together with the so-called 
“domestic exception” contained in the first paragraph of Art. 45, stating that each 
signatory applies the treaty provisionally “to the extent that such provisional application 
is not inconsistent with its constitution, laws or regulations”, has raised problems of 
transparency inasmuch it is unclear whether signatory states must make an express 
declaration in the event they are unable to provide provisional application of the 
treaty.14 During the ECT negotiations it was quite clear that under Art. 45 transparency 
should have been granted with respect to provisional application of the treaty. However, 
it is not clear whether Art. 45, para. 2 (a), imposes a legal obligation on signatory states 
to make a declaration. Provisional application of the ECT was a flashpoint in the 
famous Yukos case, in which the investors argued that Russia, which had signed the 
ECT but never ratified it, could not avoid provisional application of the treaty, having 
made no declaration in conformity with Art. 45, para. 2 (a), of the treaty. For its part, 
Russia argued that neither Art. 45, para. 1, nor Art. 45, para. 2, imposed any obligation 
to make such a declaration. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, which decided the case 
under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, though recognizing that the importance of 
transparency had been emphasized during negotiations of the treaty in the context of 
provisional application, decided that under the text of Art. 45, para. 1, no form of 
declaration was required.15 The text of Art. 45 therefore, would not seem to require ECT 
signatory states to guarantee transparency in provisional application of the treaty. 
Turning to participation, two aspects shall be taken into account: first, “internal” 
participation, i.e., the effective participation of all member states in the ECT’s decision-
making process, and, second, “external” participation, by so hinting at the participation 
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 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-
based Investor-State Arbitration, January 2014 and United Nations Convention on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, 2015. 
14
 Under Art. 45,  para. 2 (a), ECT “Notwithstanding paragraph (1) any signatory may, when signing, 
deliver to the Depository a declaration that it is not able to accept provisional application. The obligation 
contained in paragraph (1) shall not apply to a signatory making such a declaration. Any such signatory 
may at any time withdraw that declaration by written notification to the Depository”. 
15
 Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. AA 
227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 30 November 2009, 282-289. See, on provisional 
application under Art. 45 ECT, ex multis, M. POLKINGHORN, L. GOUIFFÈS, Provisional Application of the 
Energy Charter Treaty: the Conundrum, in G. COOP (ed.), Energy Dispute Resolution: Investment 
Protection, Transit and the Energy Charter Treaty, New York, 2011; A. GRAMONT, E. M. ALBAN, The 
Sun never sets: Provisional Application and the Energy Charter Treaty, in G. COOP (ed.), cit.; Y. 
BANIFANTEMI, Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty: the Negotiating History of Article 
45, in G. COOP (ed.), cit.; H. M. ARSANJANI, W. M. REISMAN, Provisional Application of Treaties in 
International Law: the Energy Charter Treaty Awards, in E. CANNIZZARO (ed.), The Law of Treaties 
beyond the Vienna Convention, Oxford, 2011; G. HAFNER, The Provisional Application of the Energy 
Charter Treaty, in C. BINDER, U. KRIEBAUM, A. REINISCH, S. WITTICH, International Investment Law for 
the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer, Oxford, 2009; A. M. NIEBRUGGE, Provisional 
Application of the Energy Charter Treaty: the Yukos Arbitration and the Future Place of Provisional 
Application in International Law, in Chicago Journal of International Law, 2007, 355-376. 
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of citizens to that process. Art. 34 guarantees the participation of member states in the 
ECT’s decision-making process by allowing each contracting party a representative at 
the principal organ of the ECT,16 the Energy Charter Conference. Moreover, it should 
be noted that the most important decisions must be unanimous,17 while less critical 
decisions are usually adopted by consensus.18 The voting system’s unanimity 
requirement thus clearly guarantees equality among all the states parties. By contrast, 
citizen participation in the decision-making process represents a large gap in the system, 
as the ECT does not provide for public participation.  
 
 
3. The Energy Community 
 
In 2005, the Energy Community Treaty, whose signatories are the European Union19 
and several third-party States,20 established a regional organization whose purpose was 
to extend the EU energy market beyond its borders, particularly to southeastern Europe. 
As has been observed, this “represents a unique product which sets up a quasi 
supranatural legal system (…) a unique chance to implement and apply dynamic 
sectoral EU acquis within third countries’ legal systems”.21 
The institutions of the Energy Community are the Ministerial Council, the Permanent 
High Level Group, the Regulatory Board, the Fora and the Secretariat. The Ministerial 
Council, the main decision-making and judicial body of the organization, and the 
PHLG, which prepares the work of the Ministerial Council, consist of one 
representative of each contracting party and two representatives of the European 
Community (today the European Union).22 The Regulatory Board, which is the 
executive organ of the Energy Community, is composed of one representative of the 
energy regulator of each contracting party, pursuant to the relevant parts of the acquis 
                                                           
16
 The Energy Charter Conference, an inter-governmental organization, is the governing and decision-
making body for the Energy Charter process, and was established by the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty. All 
states who have signed or acceded to the Treaty are members of the Conference, which meets on a regular 
basis to: discuss policy issues affecting energy cooperation among the Treaty’s signatories; review 
implementation of the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Protocol on Energy Efficiency and 
Related Environmental Aspects; and consider possible new instruments and projects on energy issues. 
17
 Cfr. Art. 36 ECT, which requires unanimity for the following decisions: (a) adoption of amendments to 
the Treaty other than amendments to Articles 34 and 35 and Annex T; (b) approval of accessions to the 
Treaty under Article 41 by states or Regional Economic Integration Organizations which were not 
signatories to the Charter as of 16 June 1995; (c) authorization the negotiation of and approval or 
adoption of the text of association agreements; (d) approval of modifications to Annexes EM, NI, G and 
B; (e) approval of technical changes to the Annexes to the Treaty; and (f) approval of the Secretary-
General’s nominations of panelists under Annex D, para. 7. 
18
 Art. 36, paragraphs 1 and 2, ECT. 
19
 Any EU Member State may obtain the status of a Participant to the Treaty. The number of Participants 
to the Treaty amounts presently to 19 EU Member States: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, united Kingdom. 
20
 Third-party States are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo and Ukraine. Pursuant to Title IX of the Treaty, neighbouring 
third parties may apply for Observer status. Observers to the Treaty presently are Armenia, Georgia, 
Norway and Turkey.   
21
 R. Petrov, Energy Community as a promoter of the European Union’s “energy acquis” to its 
Neighbourhood, in Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 2012, 331-255, 335. 
22
 Articles 47, 48, 53 and 54 EnCT. 
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communautaire on energy. The European Union is represented by the European 
Commission, assisted by one regulator of each participant, and one representative of the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators.23 The institutions of the Energy 
Community, therefore, exhibit a balanced composition between the European Union 
and partner states. Moreover, Art. 77 of the treaty provides that each party has one vote 
in the decision-making process. Therefore, “internal” participation of all parties to the 
decision-making process is guaranteed. By contrast, the treaty does not provide for any 
means of public participation by the institutions and, thus, to the decision-making 
process. However, Arts. 63-66 of the EnCT establish two organs which represent civil 
society, namely, the Fora, composed of representatives of interested parties 
(stakeholders and consumers). It must be noted that the Fora cannot adopt binding 
measures, but merely conclusions to be forwarded to the PHLG, which is not bound to 
follow them. Moreover, as the High Level Reflection Group of the Energy Community 
(a group of experts appointed by the Ministerial Council to make proposals for 
improvements to the treaty) has emphasized, the Fora do not represent a real instrument 
of consultation, since “[d]iscussions take place in other bodies and through other 
channels, including public consultation. They also duplicate to a large extent 
discussions which take place in the EU Fora”.24 
The absence of effective mechanisms of publicity and control over the acts adopted 
by the EnCT institutions manifests a clear lacuna as regards transparency, which would 
ultimately guarantee accountability in the system. The sole provision that guarantees 
openness is Art. 96, under which third party states can be admitted as observers and 
therefore attend the meetings of the Ministerial Council, the Permanent High Level 
Group, the Regulatory Board and the Fora, without, however, participating in the 
discussions. The treaty thus provides for no form of real participation by civil society. 
Some observations can also be made on the effectiveness of the system created by 
the EnCT to guarantee implementation of the treaty obligations. The system adopted by 
Artt. 90-93 of the treaty is modeled on the European infringement procedure. However, 
the mechanism’s efficacy is clearly conditioned by the fact that “there is no recourse to 
a traditional adjudicative agency that could lead to a judicial decision within the EnC’s 
dispute settlement regime. Instead, what we have within the EnC’s DSM is recourse to a 
diplomatic forum to render what appears to ultimately remain a diplomatic decision”.25 
It is not a judicial organ, but rather the Ministerial Council that determines the existence 
of a breach of a parties’ obligations. The treaty provides for no means of 
implementation of its decisions. Only in the case of a party’s serious and persistent 
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 See Art. 59 EnCT. 
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 High Level Reflection Group of the Energy Community, An Energy Community for the Future, May 
2014, Available online at https://www.energy 
community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/DOCS/3178024/Energy_Community_HLGR_Report_FI
NAL_WEB.pdf. In this regard, the Group made Proposal 4.4 providing that “[t]he role of the institutions 
of the Energy Community should be strengthened in order to better support the achievements of the 
Energy Community Treaty’s objectives. In particular (…) (4) The Energy Community Fora should be re-
examined case by case in terms of their efficiency, role and relevance. They could be replaced by pan-
European Fora also open to the stakeholders in the Contracting Parties, and/or by participation of 
experts from Contracting Parties in the existing EU Fora. The role of civil society and business in the 
institutions should be strengthened by granting them an observer role in the Permanent High Level 
Group”. 
25
 R. LEAL-ARCAS, A. FILIS, The Energy Community and the Energy Charter Treaty: Special Legal 
Regimes, their Systemic Relationship to the EU, and their Dispute Settlement Arrangements, in Oil, Gas 
& Energy Law Journal, 2014, 1-42, 23. 
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breach of its obligations may the Ministerial Council, at the request of a party, the 
Secretariat or the Regulatory Board, suspend some rights under the treaty. The EnCT’s 
implementation system contains a clear lacuna insofar as there is no judicial protection 
for individuals and companies against decisions of the institutions of the Energy 
Community. Moreover, under Art. 90 EnCT, private bodies can only “approach” the 
Secretariat with complaints, and have no direct means for calling the Ministerial 
Council’s attention to the breach of the treaty by one of the states parties. 
 
 
4. Interplay between the ECT and the EnCT 
 
The Energy Charter and the Energy Community have much in common: they are 
both international instruments promoted by the European Union for the governance of 
the energy sector. Strange to say, the two instruments seem to ignore one another, and 
the doctrine itself has paid little attention to the relationship between the two.26  
It can first be observed that most of the states parties to the EnCT are also parties to 
the ECT. However, while the EnCT aims at integrating Eastern countries in the 
European market, the ECT has rapidly became an attractive instrument also for 
countries outside the European continent, such as Australia and Japan, and has broken 
free from its European Union origins.27  
However, the theoretical compatibility between these two instruments of 
international law, which are both aimed at energy sector governance, cannot exclude 
practical problems of overlap between the two treaties. 
If a conflict between the obligations arising from the ECT and those of the EnCT 
occurs, Art. 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties would be of no use, 
since there is no overlap of states that are parties to the two treaties.28 
Under Art. 101 EnCT, obligations arising from agreements concluded before the 
signature of the EnCT cannot be affected by the provisions of that treaty. To the 
contrary, Art. 16 ECT gives preference to provisions which are favourable to the 
investor.29 However, the mere inclusion of compatibility clauses does not exclude, in 
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 One should have expected to see some references to the ECT at least in the preamble of the EnCT, in so 
much the ECT represents the first multilateral treaty concluded by the European Union in the energy 
sector. One of the few studies on the interaction between the ECT and the EnCT, although it does not 
properly focus the interplay between the two instruments, is that of R. LEAL-ARCAS, A. FILIS, The Energy 
Community and the Energy Charter Treaty: Special Legal Regimes, their Systemic Relationship to the 
EU, and their Dispute Settlement Arrangements, cit.. 
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 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine are member states of the EnCT. Georgia, Armenia, Norway and Turkey 
participate as Observers. Georgia is presently in the process of joining the Energy Community as a full-
fledged member. Nineteen European Union Member States have the status of Participants. 
Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, European Union and 
Euratom, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Mongolia, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan are parties to the ECT. 
28
 Art. 59, para. 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties would come into play if all the 
parties of a former treaty conclude another treaty relating to the same subject matter. 
29
 Art. 16 provides that “Where two or more Contracting Parties have entered into a prior international 
agreement, or enter into a subsequent international agreement, whose terms in either case concern the 
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principle, possible conflict between the obligations under the ECT and those under the 
EnCT. 
A recent decision of an ICSID tribunal, established under the ECT, dealt with 
inconsistencies between EU law and the ECT. It can thus offer some guidance on the 
issue of compatibility between the EnCT and the ECT.30 Electrabel S.A., a Belgian 
company, brought an action against Hungary for breaches of the ECT following 
Hungary’s pricing regime changes and its decision to terminate a power purchase 
agreement with Electrabel’s Hungarian subsidiary. The agreement had been terminated 
following an EU Commission decision, which established that such power purchase 
agreements constituted unlawful state aid. The tribunal was asked to address the issue of 
the relationship between the ECT and EU law. It found that the ECT and EU law are 
regimes that could and should be harmoniously interpreted in that case. Incompatibility 
between the two bodies of law was excluded “for three important legal reasons. The 
first derives from the ECT’s genesis (…) [t]he second derives from the ECT’s objectives 
(…) [t]he third derives from the ECT’s implicit recognition that decisions by the 
European Commission are legally binding on all EU Member States which are party to 
the ECT”.31 
It is well known that ICSID tribunals are not bound by precedent. Therefore the 
Electrabel decision may not be followed in the future. Moreover, it should be 
remembered that in this case the compatibility question at stake was between ECT and 
EU law rules. There is, therefore, no evidence that the decision in the Electrabel case 
could impact the relationship between ECT and EnCT rules. However, in principle it 
cannot be excluded that ICSID tribunals eventually asked to verify the compatibility 
between ECT obligations and rules under the EnCT could be tempted to make reference 
to arguments employed in the Electrabel case, even though the approach used in that 
case to analyze the relation between the ECT and EU law is debatable. The reasoning 
relating to the ECT’s genesis could also be applied to the EnCT. It could be said, 
mutatis mutandis, that the EnCT’s conclusion by the European Union and its then-
Member States should be presumed, in the absence of clear language or cogent evidence 
otherwise, to have been made in conformity with the ECT, and that therefore the 
interpretation of the EnCT’s text should be made under Art. 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties by taking into account the ECT as a “circumstance 
of its conclusion”.32 Analogously, nothing impedes application of the “objectives 
argument” to the relationship between the ECT and the EnCT, since the two treaties 
share the same objective of market integration in the energy sector. It is not implausible, 
therefore, to imagine that the arguments used in the Electrabel case could be used by 
                                                                                                                                                                          
subject matter of Part III or V of this Treaty, (1) nothing in Part III or V of this Treaty shall be construed 
to derogate from any provision of such terms of the other agreement or from any right to dispute 
resolution with respect thereto under that agreement; and (2) nothing in such terms of the other 
agreement shall be construed to derogate from any provision of Part III or V of this Treaty or from any 
right to dispute resolution with respect thereto under this Treaty, where any such provision is more 
favourable to the Investor or Investment”. 
30
 Electrabel S.A. v. the Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. Arb/07/19), Decision on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, 30 november 2012, available at 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/documents/1624. 
31
 Electrabel S.A. v. the Republic of Hungary, cit., 4.133.  
32
 It has been used provocatively the same words adopted by the Electrabel tribunal at 4.134 of the 
decision. 
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other tribunals to justify the compatibility between obligations arising under the ECT 
and those arising under the EnCT. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
On February 25th, the European Commission adopted the communication, A 
Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate 
Change Policy, a forceful call for “an integrated continent-wide energy system”.33 The 
brief analysis presented in this article has argued that multilateral instruments of 
international law implemented by the European Union to regulate the energy sector 
should be improved in order to guarantee better governance of the field. Moreover, 
greater attention should be paid to coordination of obligations arising under multilateral 
instruments adopted by the European Union in its external energy action. 
It would seem that the road for a truly integrated energy system within the European 
space is still long and winding. 
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 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank, A 
Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, 
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1. Coastal States’ Rights over the Economic resources of the EEZ 
 
The expansion in exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources in the seabed 
has led to an increase in the number of artificial islands and structures in the seas, and 
also to the proliferation of mobile structures positioned in marine areas which are 
subject to the jurisdiction of coastal States. 
As is foreseen in the UNCLOS and in customary law, productive activities carried 
out by the coastal State, either directly by them or with their consent, within the 
territorial sea, that is within 12 nautical miles from the base line, fall under the control 
of the State as regards both regulation and all the coercive activities which may derive 
from the application of the State laws, in virtue of the almost absolute sovereignty the 
State enjoys. 
In fact, the right of innocent passage of the ships of third States through the territorial 
sea of a State cannot be invoked where the pre-eminent economic interests of the State 
impose either the banning or the restriction of navigation in areas closed to fixed or 
mobile structures situated within the area of exploitation of non-living resources of the 
seabed and its subsoil. Moreover, the passage within the territorial sea of foreign vessels 
interfering with the activity of the oil rig can be considered as non-inoffensive, and it 
can be suspended in the areas adjacent to the platforms, if the interference can be 
considered as an attempt to coastal State’s security. 
In the territorial sea, the coastal State has a wide and highly discretionary power to 
regulate the navigation by imposing limitations on navigation or traffic schemes and sea 
lanes to prevent and protect the safety of oil platforms, being the state only required to 
take into account International Maritime Organization (IMO) recommendations and 
customary navigational uses in its territorial waters. 
When oil exploration and exploitation activities are decided upon or authorized by 
the coastal State in areas beyond the 12 nautical miles, within the Economic Exclusive 
Zone (EEZ) and/or the Continental Shelf (CS), these are to be considered legitimate in 
virtue of the sovereign rights of the Coastal State over the economic resources 
according to Articles 56 and 77 UNCLOS, but the powers of coastal States to protect 
the rigs or to regulate navigation in the areas closed to the rigs appear to be more 
limited.  
Art. 56 provides for coastal States’ ‘sovereign rights’ over the living and non-living 
resources of the EEZ, as well as over other activities connected with the exploration and 
economic exploitation of the zone, and for ‘jurisdictional rights’ over the establishment 
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and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, scientific research, and the 
protection of the marine environment, thus introducing a distinction between ‘sovereign 
rights’ over resources and more simple ‘jurisdictional powers’ attributed to the coastal 
States in the other domains1. 
If, on one hand, therefore, the coastal State has sovereign rights over resources, on 
the other hand, its powers over artificial structures seem to be more limited, having the 
appearance of exclusive powers to regulate exploration and exploitation structures, but 
having to coordinate with the rights of third party States to navigate and exercise the 
freedom of the High seas recognized within the EEZ and the CS. 
Indeed, the rights, whether sovereign or jurisdictional, and the related duties of 
coastal States cannot be intended to be absolute, since due regard to the rights and 
duties of other States is expressly provided for by Articles 55, 56, para. 2, and 58 
UNCLOS.2  
Art. 58, para. 2, allows for the application of the provisions regarding the high seas 
and the pertinent rules of international law only if these are compatible with the EEZ 
regime. The controversial nature of the EEZ was well known to the drafters of the 
UNCLOS, who, by the introduction of Articles 56, 58, and 59, aimed to create a 
‘permanent legal arrangement’ for balancing the diverse interests inside the EEZ. 
Indeed, Art. 59 seeks to resolve possible conflicts over the attribution of residual rights 
and jurisdiction within the EEZ not attributed or covered by the UNCLOS, with 
reference, at the same time, to equity and to all relevant circumstances.3 Nevertheless, it 
does not offer a definite solution to possible conflicts between coastal and third States4 
and it does not call for a presumption in favour of one freedom or power over another.5 
When the coastal state has proclaimed its EEZ, the legal regime of this zone will 
absorb the CS legal regime, since, according to Art. 56 UNCLOS, coastal states powers 
are extended to the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil 
within the distance of 200 nautical miles from the coast. The CS legal regime will be 
then applied to the outer CS, if claimed by the coastal state and up to the limit fixed 
unilaterally by it and accepted by the Commission for the CS (art. 76 UNCLOS). 
                                                          
1
 For a deeper examination of the EEZ see G. ANDREONE, The Economic Exclusive Zone, in D. R. 
ROTHWELL, A. G. OUDE ELFERINK, K. N. SCOTT, T. STEPHENS (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Law of 
the Sea, Oxford, 2015, 159-180. 
2
 R. BECKMAN, T. DAVENPORT, The EEZ Regime Reflection After Thirty Years, in H. N. SCHEIBER, M. S. 
KWON (eds.), Securing the Ocean for the Next Generation: Papers from the Law of the Sea Institute-
Korea Institute of Ocean Science and Technology Conference held in Seoul, Korea, May 2012 (2013) 9, 
web symposium available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/15589.htm . 
3
 See D. R. ROTHWELL, T. STEPHENS, The International Law of the Sea, Oxford, 2010, 97; I. SHEARER, 
Ocean management challenges for the law of the sea in the first decade of the 21st century, in A. G. 
OUDE ELFERINK, D. R. ROTHWELL (eds), Ocean Management in the 21st Century: Institutional 
Frameworks and Responses, Leiden, 2004, 10. 
4
 According to some authors, the reference to equity in Art. 59 substantially indicates that, in case of a 
dispute, it is necessary to recurring firstly to negotiations and to consensual means of settlement, before 
referring the dispute to judicial bodies. See R. R. CHURCHILL, A. V. LOWE, The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed., 
Manchester, 1999, 176; D. BECKMAN, T. DAVENPORT, The EEZ Regime Reflection After Thirty Years, 
cit., 12. 
5
 R. VIRZO, La convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer et la pollution provenant d’activités 
militaires dans la zone économique exclusive, in G. ANDREONE, A. CALIGIURI, G. CATALDI (eds.), Droit 
de la mer et émergences environnementales, Napoli, 2012, 255, 257; S. KARAGIANNIS, L’article 59 de la 
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, in Revue Belge de Droit International, 2004, 392, 
402. 
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In the absence of the proclamation of an EEZ, the norms to be applied to the 
activities of exploitation of oil and gas resources are those foreseen by the UNCLOS for 
the CS (Part VI of the Convention), being a zone automatically determined, requiring 
neither effective occupation nor an ad hoc proclamation on the part of the coastal State. 
This is nowadays a very rare hypothesis, relating to the minority of States which have 
not yet proclaimed their EEZ, among them many Mediterranean States. 
 
 
2. Coastal state’ Jurisdiction over Artificial Islands and Installations 
 
As for the coastal State’s jurisdictional rights on the establishment and use of 
artificial islands, installations, and structures, these are regulated by Art. 60 UNCLOS. 
The legal regime envisaged by this provision is then applied, mutatis mutandis, to the 
continental shelf in accordance with the requirements of Article 80. The rights of the 
coastal State relating to islands and installations within the EEZ and the CS are similar, 
with the sole difference that in this latter zone they are far more limited,6 since within 
the EEZ such islands and structures can be legitimately constructed and used for many 
other purposes, such as the exploitation of renewable energy. 
According to Art. 60, an almost total exclusivity is accorded to the coastal State to 
authorize and regulate various kinds of offshore construction, their placement, and their 
use within the EEZ. The distinction between artificial islands, installations, and 
structures for all the authorized economic purposes expressly provided for in Article 56 
and ‘installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of 
the coastal States in the zone’ is rather vague and often not reproduced in national 
legislation,7 but it seems to admit, in principle, the placement of such constructions by 
third States, as not interfering with coastal States’ rights.8 
The legal regime provided by Art. 60 is identical for all these types of construction, 
in relation both to rights and to duties. It is expressly provided that the coastal State can 
exercise on those constructions exclusive jurisdiction with respect to customs, tax, 
health, safety, and immigration.9 Moreover, the coastal State has the right to establish 
safety zones around those constructions, with the aim of ensuring safer navigation, or 
the protection of the construction itself, to an extent fixed by the coastal State and not 
exceeding a radius of 500 meters around the construction.10 
                                                          
6
 See R .R. CHURCHILL, A. V. LOWE, The Law of the Sea, 3rd ed., Manchester, 1999, 168. 
7
 For national legislation not distinguishing among the different types of constructions, see R. R. 
CHURCHILL, A. V. LOWE, The Law of the Sea, cit., 168; S. KOPELA, The “Territorialisation” of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone: Implications for Maritime Jurisdiction’, International Boundary Research 
Unit on ‘The State of Sovereignty, 20th Anniversary Conference, Durham UK (1–3 April 2009) 6, 
available at www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/conferences/sos/s_kopela_paper.pdf. 
8
 On this point, see E. D. BROWN, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1, Dartmouth, 1994, 243–244. 
The author argues that the construction of those installations by third States could be for military 
purposes. 
9
 Art 60, para. 2, UNCLOS: “The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial 
islands, installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety 
and immigration laws and regulations”. 
10
 Art. 60, paragraphs 4 and 5. Art. 60, para. 5, also provides for an possible extension of the safety zone 
breadth if authorized by generally accepted international standards or as recommended by the competent 
international organization. Nevertheless, to date, the IMO has never accepted the proposals to agree on 
more extended safety zones. See A. HAREL, Preventing Terrorist Attacks on Offshore Platforms: Do 
States Have Sufficient Legal Tools?, in Harvard National Security Journal, 2012, 131. 
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Coming to the duties, the coastal State is obliged to keep third States continuously 
informed about the placement of those constructions, as well as their falling into disuse, 
and also regarding all relevant technical aspects in order to ensure the safety of 
navigation. Towards this end, Art. 60, para. 3, specifically requires dismantlement 
according to general international standards established by international organizations, 
taking into account other possible implications concerning fisheries, protection of the 
marine environment, or other rights and duties of third States. 
Inevitably, the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction over those spaces implies an 
assumption of responsibility on the part of the coastal State for all the activities and the 
events occurring on them. In this context, the position of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union is worth noting. The Court stated that, according to Articles 77, 60, and 
80 UNCLOS, an EU Member State has sovereignty (albeit functional and limited 
sovereignty) over the continental shelf adjacent to it and exclusive jurisdiction over the 
artificial islands and installations positioned on it. As a consequence, the “work carried 
out on these fixed or floating installations (…) is to be regarded as work carried out in 
the territory of that State for the purposes of applying EU law” and in particular EU law 
provisions designed to ensure the freedom of movement of persons.11 
 
 
3. The Limits of the Coastal State’s Powers over the Offshore Platforms in Recent 
Practice 
 
The features of artificial constructions at sea, as well as their legal implications, vary 
dramatically according to their characteristics and to the function to which they are 
destined. Looking, then, at oil, gas, or renewable energy platforms, the extent of the 
enforcement powers of coastal States over these items has recently caused concern and, 
in particular, the question of their protection and of their environmental impact is likely 
to lead to significant developments in the EEZ legal regime. The major and irreparable 
damage to the environment which occurred in the case of the 2010 explosion of the 
British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon platform in the Gulf of Mexico, drew attention to 
the particular vulnerability of such installations, including the possibility of terrorist 
attacks.12 
Then, the 2013 seizure of the Greenpeace vessel M/V Arctic Sunrise, and of the 
activists protesting against Gazprom’s oil platform in the Russian Arctic EEZ, raised a 
number of questions about the extent of coastal State enforcement powers to protect 
offshore platforms.13 Indeed, upon the Netherlands’ request for provisional measures as 
the flag State of the M/V Arctic Sunrise, the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea 
ordered that the Arctic Sunrise and all detained persons be released,14 but did not rule on 
the merits of the dispute between the Netherlands and Russia or on the lawfulness of the 
seizure and detention of the vessel and of the 30 volunteers, most of whom were 
                                                          
11Court of Justice of the European Union, A Salemink v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut 
werknemersverzekeringen, C-347/10, judgment of 17 January 2012. 
12
 A. HAREL Preventing Terrorist Attacks on Offshore Platforms: Do States Have Sufficient Legal Tools?, 
cit., 131; S. KAYE, Threats from the Global Commons: Problems of Jurisdiction and Enforcement, in 
Melbourne Journal of International Law, 2007, 8. 
13
 A. G. OUDE ELFERINK, The Arctic Sunrise Incident: A Multi-faceted Law of the Sea Case with a Human 
Rights Dimension, in International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2014, 250, 256. 
14
 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, ‘Artic Sunrise’ Case (Netherlands v Russian Federation), 
Case No. 22, Order of the 22 November 2013. 
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arrested on board the Arctic Sunrise outside the 500-metre safety zone established by 
Russia around its platform.15 
The order of the Tribunal did not deal with the merits of the dispute, that is to say the 
legitimacy of the coercive acts on the part of the Russian authorities towards the Arctic 
Sunrise and its crew, but this question lies at the heart of the arbitration procedure set in 
motion on 4th October 2013 by Netherlands against the Russian Federation, in which the 
latter refused to take part. On one side, in fact, Netherlands complains of the violation 
of the freedom of navigation of the Greenpeace vessel within the Russian EEZ, and also 
of the violation of individual freedoms laid down in International law and Human 
Rights treaties. On the other, Russia, through some notes verbales, has asserted the full 
legitimacy of coercive actions within its EEZ if these are aimed at the protection of 
economic interests regarding the platforms and resources of the seabed.  
Putting to one side the possible results of the arbitration procedure under way, in the 
absence of any defense on Russia’s part, and also quite apart from the outcome of the 
appeals made by the 30 Greenpeace activists to the European Court of Human Rights 
against Russia, for presumed violations of Art. 5 and 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, what comes to the fore in this matter is the vulnerability of off-shore 
platforms and the considerable uncertainty that exists regarding the extent of coastal 
State’s powers to regulate or protect them.  
The most difficult problem arising from the Arctic Sunrise case concerns the 
question of enforcement powers within the EEZ, and within the safety zone which can 
be instituted around a platform up to a maximum extension of 500 meters.  
The Resolution on “Safety zones and safety of navigation around offshore 
installations and structures” (No. A.271 (16)) adopted by the IMO General Assembly on 
19 October 1989 provided that, within the safety zone, States must take every possible 
measure to ensure that, unless specifically authorized to do so, their ships do not enter 
or cross safety zones legitimately instituted by coastal States within their own EEZs. 
This resolution also describes some measures which should be adopted by ships when 
they find themselves in proximity to off-shore platforms, such as prudence, the 
observance of safe speed and distance criteria etc.  
Although these measures are contained in a recommendation, they may be 
considered as “generally accepted international norms” on navigation in proximity to 
artificial islands as set out in Art. 60, para. 6, UNCLOS. 
What raises the greatest doubts regarding interpretation, looking at disputes like the 
Arctic Sunrise case, is undoubtedly the fact that Art. 60 gives no explicit description of 
the enforcement powers of the coastal State over ships which may represent a danger to 
exploitation activities and/or to the platform itself.  
The doctrine holds, however, that these powers must be understood to be very wide, 
since they derive from the exercise of full jurisdiction. 
                                                          
15
 According to Art. 16 of the Federal Law on Continental Shelf, adopted on 25 October 1995, the 
Russian Federation established safety zones around its installations extended for not more than 500 
meters. The English version of the Law text is available at 
www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/RUS_1995_Law.pdf. It has to be 
recalled that the Russian Federation’s Coast Guard communicated over the radio to the M/V Arctic 
Sunrise that it was not permitted to enter in a radius of 3 nautical miles around the platform, but the 
Greenpeace vessel did it. On the irrelevance of the excessive Russian claim to a 3 nm zone, see A. G. 
OUDE ELFERINK, The Arctic Sunrise Incident: A Multi-faceted Law of the Sea Case with a Human Rights 
Dimension, cit., 250 and 256. 
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Art. 60, para. 4, however, gives the impression of a limitation of enforcement powers 
within the safety zone, since it provides for the adoption of “appropriate measures” for 
the safety of navigation and of the installation within the safety zone and not outside it, 
and therefore not beyond a distance of 500 meters from the fixed or mobile installation. 
This provision means that the coastal State cannot be considered to enjoy all the 
coercive powers necessary to prevent and repress actions harmful or potentially harmful 
to the economic interests or safety of a platform which occur outside a radius of 500 
meters from that platform. Outside the safety zone, if one has been instituted, the State 
is thus obliged to guarantee freedom of navigation, and would not have any great 
margin of possible action to prevent interference with or attacks on its platforms. 
In any case, Art. 60, para. 4, with the term “appropriate measures” implies a high 
level of discretionary powers of the coastal State to evaluate the kind of measures 
necessary to eliminate the unauthorized presence of foreign ships in these areas, and to 
prevent any attempt at unauthorized access into the safety zones. Precautionary 
measures such as the confiscation of documents of a ship found in the proximity of a 
platform were adopted by Norway in 1993 in a case involving the Greenpeace ship 
Solo, which was engaged in peaceful protest activity against off-shore oil drilling.  
This interpretation of the enforcement powers of the coastal State seems to be 
confirmed by Art. 111, para. 2, UNCLOS which says “The right of hot pursuit shall 
apply mutatis mutandis to violations in the exclusive economic zone or on the 
continental shelf, including safety zones around continental shelf installations, of the 
laws and regulations of the coastal State applicable in accordance with this Convention 
to the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf, including such safety zones.” 
Something may be deduced from the general principle according to which 
enforcement powers may be exercised as long as the ship is inside the maritime zone 
over which the State enjoys such powers. Since coastal States enjoy greater powers 
inside the safety zones than they do within the EEZ or CS, the State may be deemed 
unable to exercise enforcement powers over a ship when that ship is outside the safety 
zone. 
 
 
4. Final Remarks 
 
Several critical aspects have emerged with regard to the exercise of Coastal States’ 
powers over offshore platforms and to the balancing of States sovereign and 
jurisdictional rights with the freedom of navigation in the zones beyond the territorial 
seas. In particular, when difficulties in interpreting international rules occur, the 
negative impact of them in semi-enclosed and fragile seas is much more evident and 
risky. Furthermore it must be emphasized that in a semi-enclosed sea, such as the 
Adriatic, an eventual attack to operating offshore installations could provoke serious 
consequences and, then, should be prevented by all lawful means. 
The Adriatic Sea is also well known by biologists, and not only by lawyers, for the 
difficulties of marine living resources management and marine biodiversity 
conservation in disputed areas. These marine areas have been recently object of interest 
from the scientific community who has launched a proposal for the creation of Marine 
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Peace Parks.16 The creation of a Marine Peace Park in the Adriatic Sea could have some 
implications for the existing and future gas and oil offshore platforms in the area. 
There is another interesting development regarding the life of the offshore platforms 
which could interest the Adriatic Sea. The oil and gas rigs at the end of their use should 
be dismantled, as mentioned above. Nevertheless, it has been observed that the practice 
of abandoning the rigs, without dismantling them, has produced in some cases 
interesting consequences for the marine ecosystem and has raised the issue of possible 
re-use of platforms as artificial reefs.17 The scientific discussion on this unexpected 
effects of accidental sinking or voluntary abandonment has been developed after the 
tragic case of the wreck of the “Paguro” Agip platform, which sank in the northern 
Adriatic Sea in 1965.18 Many years after this accident, thanking to the exceptional 
aquatic life which developed in the artificial reef, the wreck of the Paguro platform has 
turned into a popular destination for sport divers. Indeed, the ecosystem adapted to the 
rigs, after years, has in some cases created a new and rare ecosystem that becomes itself 
worthy of protection. 
 
                                                          
16
 See P. MACKELWORTH, D. HOLCER, B. LAZAR, Using conservation as a tool to resolve conflict: 
Establishing the Piran–Savudrija international Marine Peace Park, in Marine Policy, 2013, 112-119. 
17
 M. PONTI, M. ABBIATI, V. U. CECCHERELLI, Drilling platforms as artificial reefs: distribution of 
macrobenthic assemblages of the “Paguro” wreck (northern Adriatic Sea), in ICES Journal of Marine 
Science, 2002, 316–323. The authors argue as follows on the biological changes occurred to the 
ecosystem on the wreck of a oil platform: “The offshore wreck of the ‘Paguro’ drilling platform also 
hosted a rich fauna, presumably reflecting a high structural complexity as well as its wide bathymetric 
range. (…) This is important in light of potential re-use of decommissioned platforms as artificial reefs in 
the northern Adriatic Sea, because an appropriate disposal strategy should take into account these 
effects.” 
18
 The accident, during the drilling of a new methane, caused the offshore platform Paguro to explode 
and sink to the bottom of the sea. This tragedy also caused the death of three persons. The sunk platform 
is located now at 12 miles away from the port of Marina di Ravenna at a depth of 25 meters. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Up to now, the oil and gas industry is not as well established in the Mediterranean 
region as in other parts of the world, but the number of offshore installations is 
increasing and future perspectives exist. Furthermore, new deposits have been 
discovered that may be exploited, since deep and even ultra-deep drilling is now 
possible. But the risks involved in a fragile and semi-enclosed sea with seismic activity, 
as the Mediterranean, are even more important. Indeed, a disaster on a platform in the 
region would have a dramatic effect and irreversible consequences, because of the small 
size of the basin and the low rate of water renewal.1  
Obviously, these risks are also of great concern in the Adriatic Sea, a semi-enclosed 
sea in a semi-enclosed sea, and Ionian Sea, where offshore exploration and exploitation 
are already a reality. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Italia, Greece, 
Montenegro and Slovenia are involved as bordering States, as well as all Mediterranean 
States and the European Union, since four of the seven riparian are also Member States, 
and as shown by the Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas.  
In this context, problems of marine pollution resulting from offshore activities are to 
be understood both according to International and European Union Law.2 
 
 
2. International Law: Regional Sea and Environmental Protection 
                                                 
1
 On legal challenges, see N. ROS, Exploration, Exploitation and Protection of the Mediterranean 
Continental Shelf, in C. CINELLI, E. M. VÁSQUEZ GÓMEZ (eds), Regional Strategies to Maritime Security: 
a Comparative Perspective, Valencia, 2014, 101-132; Quel régime juridique pour l’exploitation offshore 
en Méditerranée?, in Annuaire de Droit Maritime et Océanique 2015, Tome XXXIII (forthcoming). 
2
 N. ROS, La réglementation euro-méditerranéenne des activités offshore, in Diritto del Commercio 
Internazionale, 2015, 121-164; L. SCHIANO DI PEPE, Offshore oil and gas operations in the 
Mediterranean Sea: regulatory gaps, recent developments and future perspectives, in J. JUSTE RUIZ, V. 
BOU FRANCH (ed.), Derecho del Mar y Sostenibilidad ambiental en el Mediterráneo, Valencia, 2014, 
363-387; International Marine Environmental Law and the EU: An Adequate Framework to Address 
Environmental Emergencies?, in I. GOVAERE, S. POLI (ed.), EU Management of Global Emergencies: 
Legal Framework for Combating Threats and Crises, Leiden – Boston, 2014, Chapter 14, 298-303. 
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The profile of International Law, Regional Sea and Environmental Protection, relies 
on a conventional framework, the Barcelona System, involving the twenty-one 
bordering States and the European Union, and more specifically on a governance 
framework, the Offshore Protocol.  
 
2.1. A Conventional Framework: The Barcelona System 
 
a) The Barcelona Convention and Protocols 
The Barcelona Convention and its Protocols constitute the legal dimension of the 
Mediterranean Action Plan, developed in the framework of UNEP, according to 
International Law and United Nations cooperation principles.3 The Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean, the 
amended version adopted on 10 June 1995,4 is an umbrella-treaty integrating all the Rio 
outcomes and intending to set up an environmental and sustainable governance, fighting 
against all the forms of marine pollution, including Pollution Resulting from 
Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil.5  
With its seven thematic Protocols, all in force since March 2011, it forms a global 
regional system addressing the different forms of pollution and environmental 
challenges: Dumping;6 Prevention and Emergency;7 Land-Based Sources;8 Specially 
Protected Areas and Biological Diversity;9 Offshore;10 Hazardous Wastes;11 Integrated 
Coastal Zone Management.12  
 
b) The 1994 Offshore Protocol  
The Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting 
from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its 
                                                 
3
 See http://www.unepmap.org/index.php. 
4
 See http://195.97.36.231/dbases/webdocs/BCP/bc95_Eng_p.pdf. The initial version of the Barcelona 
Convention, the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, was adopted 
on 16 February 1976 and entered into force on 12 February 1978; the 1995 Convention entered into force 
on 9 July 2004. 
5
 Art. 7 Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed 
and its Subsoil: “The Contracting Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate, combat 
and to the fullest possible extent eliminate pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Area resulting from 
exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil”. 
6
 Protocol for the Prevention and Elimination of Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from 
Ships and Aircraft or Incineration at Sea, adopted in 1976 and entered into force in 1978; the amended 
version, adopted in 1995, is not yet in force. 
7
 Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Preventing Pollution from Ships and, in Cases of Emergency, 
Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, adopted in 2002 and entered into force in 2004. 
8
 Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities, adopted 
in 1996 and entered into force in 2008. 
9
 Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean, adopted 
in 1995 and entered into force in 1999. 
10
 Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and 
Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil, adopted in 1994 and entered into 
force in 2011. 
11
 Protocol on the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, adopted in 1996 and entered into force in 2008. 
12
 Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean, adopted in 2008 and entered 
into force in 2011. 
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Subsoil was adopted in Madrid on 14 October 1994, and entered into force on 24 March 
2011.13  
It’s not only a dedicated conventional act but also one of the two existing treaties in 
the world currently dealing with offshore activities; the other is the Protocol Concerning 
Marine Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf, 
adopted in 1989 and entered into force in 1990, in the framework of the 1978 Kuwait 
Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment 
from Pollution, in the ROPME Sea Area, including the Persian Gulf and the Sea of 
Oman, a region where offshore issues are very important.  
This aspect enhances the pioneering dimension of the Protocol as an integrated 
conventional act, adopted in 1994 to be part of the new framework integrating the Rio 
outcomes. In addition to the Barcelona Convention, it also refers to two of its protocols, 
now replaced in their latest version by the 1995 Convention, the 1995 Protocol 
Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean,14 
and the 2002 Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Preventing Pollution from Ships and, 
in Cases of Emergency, Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea.15 The systemic 
integration has also an institutional dimension, since the Offshore Protocol gives an 
operational role, in case of emergency, to the Regional Activity Center of the 
Prevention and Emergency Protocol, the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency 
Response Center for the Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC).16  
 
2.2. A Governance Framework: The Offshore Protocol 
 
a) A Global and Ambitious Protocol 
In practice, and despite the financial difficulties encountered by UNEP/MAP, 
REMPEC seems intended to play an important role in the implementation of a 
governance framework, under the Offshore Protocol, defined as global and ambitious, 
as evidenced by its legal scope. From the vantage point of geography, and contrary to 
what might suggest the reference to the continental shelf in the title of the Protocol, it 
encompasses the whole Mediterranean Sea area. As regards the activities, the Offshore 
Protocol adopts a holistic approach of offshore operations, including scientific research, 
all the forms of exploration and the global process of exploitation, from the 
establishment of an installation to its removal, from drilling to transportation. Finally, 
all mineral resources are concerned, whether solid, liquid or gaseous; therefore, the 
Protocol is not only applicable to conventional oil and gas activities.  
This broad scope is associated with a high level of requirements. Although the 
Protocol is now twenty years old and, therefore, can’t integrate the latest legal and 
technological innovations, it still appears pioneering and characterized by a high level 
of requirements for the Parties and operators: written authorization for exploration and 
exploitation; use of the best available techniques and standards to minimize the risk of 
pollution; sanctions for breaches of conventional obligations; environmental impact 
assessments; mutual assistance in cases of emergency; insurance and other financial 
                                                 
13
 See http://195.97.36.231/dbases/webdocs/BCP/ProtocolOffshore94_eng.pdf. 
14
 See http://195.97.36.231/dbases/webdocs/BCP/ProtocolSPA95_eng.pdf. 
15
 See http://195.97.36.231/dbases/webdocs/BCP/ProtocolEmergency02_eng.pdf. 
16
 See http://www.rempec.org. 
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security to cover liability.17 Actually, this high level of requirements is the reason of the 
low level of ratifications, particularly by the European States, and it explains the late 
entry into force, especially because of the compulsory insurance, with the six 
ratifications of Albania, Cyprus, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. Although the 
European Union has now accessed to the Protocol, its Member States don’t manifest 
their intention to ratify the Protocol in the near future: they have all signed it with the 
exception of France; and outside the EU, the situation is not so different, Israel and 
Monaco have signed, but other States have neither signed nor ratified.  
 
b) Towards a Legal Governance 
     By the fact, the system is evolving towards a legal governance. The implementation 
of the Protocol began during the CoP 17 of the Barcelona Convention in 2012, with the 
adoption of a Decision establishing an ad hoc working group coordinated by REMPEC, 
in order to develop a dedicated Action Plan, by CoP 19 at the end of 2015.18  
     The future of the Protocol relies on the effective adoption of this Action Plan whose 
main three objectives are: setting-up a governance framework, defining regional 
offshore standards and guidelines, and develop a regional reporting and monitoring 
mechanism. Without considering the revision of the Protocol, it seems necessary to 
update some provisions, especially in the Annexes. Amendments should be rapidly 
adopted, while the number of Parties is still limited and the three-fourths majority vote, 
legally necessary, a priori easier to obtain, in order to enter into force afterwards 
automatically for each new Contracting Party. 
 
 
3. European Union Law: Economic Integration and Industrial Safety 
 
Obviously, this traditional approach of International Law is complemented and 
reinforced by the profile of European Union Law, Economic Integration and Industrial 
Safety; in order to cope with problems of marine pollution resulting from offshore 
activities, the European strategy requires the integration of the Mediterranean acquis 
into EU Law and the application of EU Law to Mediterranean governance. 
 
3.1. Integration of the Mediterranean Acquis into EU Law 
 
a) The Accession of the EU to the Offshore Protocol 
                                                 
17
 Concerning the Protocol and its legal contribution, see E. RAFTOPOULOS, Sustainable Governance of 
Offshore Oil and Gas Development in the Mediterranean: Revitalizing the Dormant Mediterranean 
Offshore Protocol, Thursday 19 August 2010, MEPIELAN E-Bulletin (http://www.mepielan-
ebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&CategoryId=4&ArticleId=29&Article=Sustainable-Governance-of-
Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Development-in-the-Mediterranean:-Revitalizing-the-Dormant-Mediterranean-
Offshore-Protocol); L. SCHIANO DI PEPE, Offshore oil and gas operations in the Mediterranean Sea: 
regulatory gaps, recent developments and future perspectives, in J. JUSTE RUIZ, V. BOU FRANCH (ed.), 
Derecho del Mar y Sostenibilidad ambiental en el Mediterráneo, Valencia, 2014, 371-375. 
18
 Report of the 17th Ordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean and its Protocols, Paris, France, 
10th-12th February 2012, UNEP(DEPI)/MED IG.20/8, 14 February 2012, Part I, Annex II Thematic 
Decisions, Decision IG.20/12, 217-218, 
http://195.97.36.231/dbases/MAPmeetingDocs/12IG20_8_Eng.pdf. 
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The first step is the integration of the Mediterranean acquis into EU Law, and first of 
all the accession of the EU to the Offshore Protocol. Prior to its adoption, the 
Commission had proposed to the Council to sign the Protocol,19 but it was then deemed 
more appropriate to work further on a Community regime for environmental liability 
rather than anticipate it through an international agreement. The current situation is 
clearly the result of a strategic change of mind occurred, in the aftermath of the accident 
in the Gulf of Mexico, on the Deepwater Horizon, on 20 April 2010, when the 
European Union became more aware of all the potential for resulting risks, especially in 
the Mediterranean. A Commission Communication adopted on 12 October 2010, and 
titled Facing the challenge of the safety of offshore oil and gas activities, recommended 
to re-launch the process towards bringing into force the Offshore Protocol, in close 
collaboration with the Member States concerned and the REMPEC.20 This proposition 
was supported by the Parliament in its resolution of 13 September 2011,21 while the 
Protocol was already entered into force. One month later, on 27 October 2011, the 
Commission published a proposal for a Council Decision to approve the accession of 
the European Union to the Offshore Protocol, in a global legal framework including the 
development of EU Law.22  
 
b) Legal Consequences of the Accession  
On 20 November 2012, the Parliament finally consented23 and the Decision of 
accession was adopted by the Council on 17 December 2012,24 with all the legal 
consequences according to EU Law and due to the integration of the Protocol into the 
European Union legal order. The immediate legal effects are twofold because the 
Offshore Protocol may be rightly considered to enter into the legal framework of Art. 
216 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and to be an 
agreement “binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States”.25 
                                                 
19
 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the Signature 
of a Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution resulting from Exploration 
and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil, COM(94) 397 final, 22 
September 1994. 
20
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Facing the 
challenge of the safety of offshore oil and gas activities, COM(2010) 560 final, 12 October 2010, 
21
 European Parliament resolution of 13 September 2011 on facing the challenges of the safety of offshore 
oil and gas activities (2011/2072(INI)), P7_TA(2011)0366. 
22
 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the accession of the European Union to the 
Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution resulting from exploration and 
exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil, COM(2011) 690 final, 2011/0304 
(NLE), 27 October 2011 
23
 European Parliament legislative resolution of 20 November 2012 on the draft Council decision on the 
accession of the European Union to the Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against 
pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf and the seabed and its 
subsoil (09671/2012 – C7-0144/2012 – 2011/0304(NLE)), P7_TA(2012)0415. 
24
 Council Decision of 17 December 2012 on the accession of the European Union to the Protocol for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution resulting from exploration and exploitation of the 
continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil (2013/5/EU), Official Journal of the European Union, 9 
January 2013, L 4/13-14. 
25
 Art. 216 TFEU: “1. The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or 
international organisations where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is 
necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union's policies, one of the objectives referred 
to in the Treaties, or is provided for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or 
alter their scope. 2. Agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union 
and on its Member States”. 
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Anyway, after the accession of the European Union, and the integration of the Offshore 
Protocol into EU Law, the obligations relating to its implementation are not only 
incumbent upon the European Union, but also largely upon its Member States, which 
have to transpose its provisions into domestic law even though they have not ratified the 
Protocol. Furthermore, EU Law shall contribute to reinforce the contribution of the 
Offshore Protocol, through the acquis and the new role assigned to the European 
Maritime Safety Agency. Indeed a Regulation adopted in 2013 extends EMSA 
competencies, both from the material and geographical point of view, first to response 
to marine pollution caused by oil and gas installations, and second to States applying for 
accession to the Union and European Neighbourhood partner countries, which include 
Mediterranean non-Member States.26 Therefore, EMSA is able to be involved in the 
implementation of certain aspects of the Offshore Protocol and may even collaborate 
with REMPEC.  
Obviously, the Decision of accession also has consequences for Member States due 
to their legal status of Parties to the Barcelona System. This should encourage or incite 
the Mediterranean Member States to ratify, although they remain the most fervent 
opponents to the Protocol; but more than two years later, and even though some of them 
have announced their intention to ratify (France, Italy, Malta), implement (Greece) or 
transpose (Slovenia), the status quo remains... and Cyprus is still the only EU Member 
State Party to the Offshore Protocol. However, ratification by Mediterranean EU 
Member States is not unnecessary, furthermore at the Mediterranean level where the 
Protocol needs more ratifications, and a better balance between EU and non-EU 
Member States, to become more effective and enhance cooperation and environmental 
protection. 
 
3.2. Application of EU Law to Mediterranean Governance 
 
a) The Directive on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations  
The other option is the application of EU Law to Mediterranean governance, 
especially the Directive on safety of offshore oil and gas operations, adopted on 12 June 
2013,27 following a formal evolution from a proposed regulation to a directive. Like the 
accession to the Protocol, this normative process, specifically European, originates in 
the awareness resulting from the Deepwater Horizon accident, and the aforementioned 
Communication from the Commission of October 2010. For the first time, the adoption 
of a comprehensive legislative framework is planned at EU level; to this end, the 
Commission made, on 27 October 2011, the initial and ambitious choice of a regulation, 
directly binding upon Member States, in order to establish a harmonized EU system, 
automatically incorporated into the domestic legal order of all the Member States.28 On 
3 December 2012, this strategy was definitely challenged in the Council, at the 
instigation of the States particularly concerned by offshore activities. By 21 February 
                                                 
26
 Regulation (EU) N° 100/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2013 
amending Regulation (EC) N° 1406/2002 establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency, Official 
Journal of the European Union, 9 February 2013, L 39, 30-40. 
27
 Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 June 2013 on safety of 
offshore oil and gas operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC, Official Journal of the European 
Union, 28 June 2013, L 178, 66-106.  
28
 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
safety of offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and production activities, COM(2011) 688 final, 
2011/0309 (COD), 27 October 2011. 
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2013, the European Parliament and the Council reached a political agreement and 
recommended the adoption of a directive, a disappointing option, much less ambitious, 
since it only establishes objectives and leaves the Member States free of the means to 
achieve them during the transposition.  
In practice, there are some synergies with the Offshore Protocol and such a 
complementarity is even necessary in the perspective of a regional governance.29 The 
accession Decision and the Directive must be considered in close relation; they have a 
common purpose, but they are not of the same generation and have specific objectives 
and focus, with rather different geographic and functional scopes. The Protocol has a 
profile of International Law, dedicated to environmental protection and fight against 
pollution of the Mediterranean Sea; it’s a legal instrument of regional cooperation, with 
the broad objective to protect against pollution from offshore activities, and a holistic 
approach, including the whole process of offshore activities, scientific research, 
exploration and exploitation, and all the mineral resources of the continental shelf. The 
Directive has a profile of EU Law, focused on economic integration and industrial 
safety. It has a more specific scope than the Protocol, that is to ensure the safety of 
offshore activities, excluding research and transport, and is limited to the oil and gas 
operations, in the maritime areas under Member States jurisdiction. Its main objective is 
to prevent major accidents and limit their consequences, by establishing minimum 
safety requirements likely to contribute to an indirect improvement of environmental 
conditions and health of workers.30  
 
b) Participation of EU Law to Mediterranean Governance 
In this context, participation of EU Law to Mediterranean governance may be very 
complex to implement; it’s a real but disappointing normative contribution. 
Complementary to the Directive, the EU acquis is relatively important; it encompasses 
fifteen European legal acts, in the field of environment, including marine issues, safety 
and health of workers and civil protection, and industrial safety, including the oil 
industry.31 As regards the Directive, its main objective is threefold: to reduce as far as 
                                                 
29
 See Final Report - Safety of offshore exploration and exploitation activities in the Mediterranean: 
creating synergies between the forthcoming EU Regulation and the Protocol to the Barcelona 
Convention, May 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/international-cooperation/regional-sea-
conventions/barcelona-
convention/pdf/Final%20Report%20Offshore%20Safety%20Barcelona%20Protocol%20.pdf.    
30
 For a doctrinal analysis of the Directive, see J. JUSTE RUIZ, La directive européenne sur la sécurité des 
opérations pétrolières et gazières en mer, in Revue Juridique de l’Environnement, 2014, 23-43; and more 
specifically in a Mediterranean perspective, L. SCHIANO DI PEPE, Offshore oil and gas operations in the 
Mediterranean Sea: regulatory gaps, recent developments and future perspectives, in J. JUSTE RUIZ, V. 
BOU FRANCH (ed.), Derecho del Mar y Sostenibilidad ambiental en el Mediterráneo, Valencia, 2014, 
378-387. 
31
 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna 
and flora (Habitats Directive); Council Directive 92/91/EEC of 3 November 1992 concerning the 
minimum requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers in the mineral-
extracting industry through drilling (eleventh individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of 
Directive 89/391/EEC) (Health and safety of workers Directive); Directive 94/9/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 23 March 1994 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
concerning equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres; 
Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for 
granting and using authorizations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons 
(Hydrocarbons Directive); Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-
accident hazards involving dangerous substances (Seveso II Directive); Directive 97/23/EC of the 
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possible the occurrence of major accidents relating to offshore oil and gas operations; to 
limit their consequences, thus increasing the protection of the marine environment and 
coastal economies against pollution; to improve the response mechanisms in case of an 
accident. Obviously, it is a step forward, but it’s far below initial expectations. Indeed, 
the lobbies of the oil and gas industry, as well as States particularly involved in offshore 
activities, have not only worked in favor of a directive rather than a regulation, but also 
to reduce the scope of the text that appears really very disappointing. Overall, the 
established rules lack clarity and provide only partial solutions to global problems; most 
of the provisions are mere soft law... and no independent monitoring and supervision 
role was granted to EMSA.  
In practice, the Directive appears a future contribution with geographical limits. 
Ratione temporis, and as regards States, the transposition of the Directive shall occur 
within a period of two years (July 2015); regarding industrial operators, a three years 
period is granted in the case of planned installations (July 2016) and a five years period 
in relation to existing installations (July 2018). Ratione personae, the scope of the 
Directive varies according to circumstances. Only coastal Member States having 
offshore oil and gas operations carried out in the waters under their jurisdiction shall 
transpose the whole Directive. Other coastal Member States shall be obliged to bring 
into force only those measures which are necessary to ensure compliance with three 
articles,32 and particularly Art. 20 which mentions the eventuality of a report in case of a 
major accident occurred during offshore oil and gas operations conducted outside the 
Union, the only provision that shall be transposed even by landlocked States; but States 
where no offshore company is registered in are not concerned by this requirement, and 
the Commission has underlined the risks associated with this precedent, both as regards 
the integrity of EU Law and in terms of possible circumvention. Ratione loci, the 
transposition is only an obligation for offshore operations conducted in the maritime 
areas under the jurisdiction of Member States. In the Mediterranean, it concerns only 
                                                                                                                                               
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 May 1997 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States concerning pressure equipment; Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with regard to the 
prevention and remedying of environmental damage (Environmental Liability Directive or ELD); 
Directive 2006/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on machinery, and 
amending Directive 95/16/EC; Regulation (EC) N° 1907/2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH); Council Decision of 8 November 2007 
establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism; Directive 2008/56/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the 
field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive); Directive 2008/98/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on waste and repealing certain 
Directives (Waste Framework Directive); Regulation (EC) N° 1272/2008 on classification, labelling and 
packaging of substances and mixtures (CLP Regulation); Directive 2009/147/EC on the conservation of 
wild birds (Birds Directive); Directive 2014/52/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private 
projects on the environment. Three relevant conventions can also be considered to be part of the EU 
acquis: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 10 December 1982; Convention 
on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention) of 25 February 
1991; and United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus 
Convention) of 25 June 1998. 
32
 Art. 20 Offshore oil and gas operations conducted outside the Union; Art. 32 Transboundary 
emergency preparedness and response of Member States without offshore oil and gas operations under 
their jurisdiction; Art. 34 Penalties. 
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eight States and the areas under their jurisdiction, so it could lead to a fragmentation of 
the legal regime, a fortiori when there are little or no convergences with the Protocol. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
In the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, as in the whole Mediterranean, problems of marine 
pollution resulting from offshore activities require both International and EU Law 
profiles. Solutions should arise at the crossroads between a Mediterranean Protocol 
dedicated to protection against pollution from offshore activities, to which Member 
States of the European Union remain largely refractory, and the logic of economic 
integration and industrial safety, initiated by the European Directive, which is 
functionally more restrictive and applies only to Member States. We just have to hope 
that this effective improvement will be possible without the occurrence of disasters, 
unlike maritime navigation with Erika and Prestige shipwrecks.  
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CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE CAUSED IN CONNECTION WITH 
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES: WHERE ARE WE NOW? 
 
Lorenzo SCHIANO DI PEPE 
 
 
SUMMARY – 1. Liability for Damage Arising out of Offshore Accidents … as a Measure of Last Resort? – 
2. Civil Liability for Offshore Oil and Gas Activities at the Global Level … or not? – 3. Directive 
2013/30/EU on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations: What Room for the Polluter Pays 
Principle? – 4. Civil Liability and Compensation for Offshore Activities under EU Law: What Lies 
ahead? 
 
 
1. Liability for Damage Arising out of Offshore Accidents … as a Measure of Last 
Resort? 
 
As with any human activity likely to cause sudden or persistent environmental 
degradation, also offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation are nowadays subject 
to a considerable body of international, European and national rules. A comprehensive 
assessment of the relevant norms goes clearly beyond the scope of the present 
contribution; suffice it to say that differing views exist on the completeness of such 
normative system and the adequateness of the level of protection accorded by it.1 
What can be remarked here is that, undoubtedly, legislative efforts have so far 
focussed especially on accidents prevention and response rather than on liability and 
compensation. In a sense, this is understandable for at least two main reasons. On the 
one hand, as it is well known, the principle of prevention which forms an integral part 
of environmental law at all levels, requires that, first and foremost, measures are put in 
place in order to prevent the occurrence of accidents likely to cause environmental 
damage or, at least, to minimise their impact. On the other hand, whilst it may be 
(relatively) easy to agree on (and, conversely, impose on the relevant operators) a set of 
preventative rules – as these will be broadly speaking based on a common ground of 
practical knowledge and technical expertise – the same may be less true of liability and 
compensation regimes.2 
                                                 
1
 For a general outline of the subject, with particular regard to the prevention aspects, reference can be 
made Lorenzo SCHIANO DI PEPE, Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in the Mediterranean Sea: Regulatory 
Gaps, Recent Developments and Future Perspectives, in J. JUSTE RUIZ, V. BOU FRANCH (ed.), Derecho 
del mar y sostenibilidad ambiental en el Mediterráneo, Valencia, 2014, 363. 
2
 The debate around the question of liability for damage arising out of offshore accidents has been quite 
active, as demonstrate for example by contributions such as the following: R. ABEYRATNE, The 
Deepwater Horizon Disaster – Some Liability Issues, in Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 2010, 125 ff.; B. 
J. BUSH, The Answer Lies in Admiralty: Justifying Oil Spill Punitive Damages Recovery Through 
Admiralty Law, Lewis & Clark Law School Environmental Law, 2011, 1255 ff.; Martin DAVIES, Liability 
issues raised by the Deepwater Horizon blowout, in Australian & New Zealand Maritime Law Journal, 
2011, 35 ff.; K. G. ENGERRAND, Indemnity for Gross Negligence in Maritime Oilfield Contracts, in 
Loyola Maritime Law Journal, 2011-2012, 319 ff.; V. J. FOLEY, Post-Deepwater Horizon: the changing 
landscape of liability for oil pollution in the United States, in Albany Law Review, 2010, 515 ff.; T. 
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Examples of such an approach are provided by the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea3 as several provisions contained therein require contracting 
parties to establish global and regional rules to prevent marine environmental 
degradation with particular reference to activities such as drilling and the operation of 
offshore installations. More on point, at the regional level, significant results have been 
achieved in the North East Atlantic and, to a lesser extent (as it shall be seen), in the 
Mediterranean Sea, as demonstrated, respectively, by the 1992 Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic4 (Art. 5 and Annex III) 
and the 1994 Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 
Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed 
and its Subsoil,5 part of the so-called “Barcelona system” made up of (what is now) the 
1995 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region 
of the Mediterranean and its seven thematic protocols.6 
More recently, and in the same vein, Directive 2013/30/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, of 12 June 2013,7 purported to introduce a set of rules 
establishing “minimum requirements for preventing major accidents in offshore oil and 
gas operations and limiting the consequences of such accidents”. 
The very wording used by the Directive’s Art. 1, reproduced above, reminds us, 
however, that sometimes the occurrence of an accident simply cannot be excluded, 
notwithstanding the existence of sophisticated, state-of-the-art preventive regimes, and 
that some damage is likely to be occur when the relevant rules of prevention are not 
complied with or fail to meet their objective for other reasons.  
This demonstrates the pressing need for a specific liability regime to function not 
only as an additional deterrent for operators but also as a tool to ensure that victims are 
adequately compensated if and when one of such accidents occurs. In this respect, 
liability and compensation are to be seen not only as a measure of last resort or as a 
“mere” safety net to come into play … just in case something goes wrong, but rather as 
a complementary instrument working together with preventive regimes. 
 
 
2. Civil Liability for Offshore Oil and Gas Activities at the Global and Regional 
Level ... or not?  
 
                                                                                                                                               
KURTZ-SHEFFORD, Liability for offshore facility pollution damage after the Deepwater Horizon? What 
happened to the global solution?, in Journal of International Maritime Law, 2012, 453 ff.; K. NOUSSIA, 
The BP Oil Spill – Environmental Pollution Liability and Other Legal Ramifications, in European Energy 
and Environmental Law Review, 2011, 98 ff.; A. D. PAUL, Rethinking Oil Spill Compensation Schemes: 
The Causation Inquiry, in Loyola Maritime Law Journal, 2011, 137 ff.; T. J. SCHOENBAUM, Liability for 
Damages in Oil Spill Accidents: Evaluating the USA and International Law Regimes in the Light of 
Deepwater Horizon, in Journal of Environmental Law, 2012, 395 ff.; T. SCOVAZZI, Maritime Accidents 
with Particular Emphasis on Liability and Compensation for Damage from the Exploitation of Mineral 
Resources of the Seabed, in A. DE GUTTRY, M. GESTRI, G. VENTURINI (eds.), International Disaster 
Response Law, The Hague, 2012, 287 ff. 
3
 Adopted on 10 December 1982; entered into force at the international level on 16 November 1994. 
4
 Adopted on 22 September 1992; entered into force at the international level on 25 March 1998. 
5
 Adopted on 14 October 1994; entered into force at the international level on 24 March 2011. 
6
 Adopted 10 June 1995; entered into force at the international level on 9 July 2004. 
7
 Directive 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on safety of offshore oil and gas 
operations and amending Directive 2004/35/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, 28 June 2013, L 
178, 66. 
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As it has been authoritatively noted, liability and compensation issues are not 
properly dealt with by any global or regional legal instrument currently in force, when it 
comes to offshore oil and gas activities.8 
As a starting point, despite the moving nature of many offshore platforms, a 
successful liability and compensation regime such as the one jointly established by the 
1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage9, on the one 
hamd, and the 1992 International Convention on the Establishment of an International 
Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage10, on the other hand, will be clearly 
not applicable insofar as the “object” involved does not fall within the definition of 
‘ship’ provided thereby, viz.,according to art. I.1 of the former, “any sea-going vessel 
and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or adapted for the carriage of 
oil in bulk as cargo, provided that a ship capable of carrying oil and other cargoes 
shall be regarded as a ship only when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and 
during any voyage following such carriage unless it is proved that it has no residues of 
such carriage of oil in bulk aboard”. 
A more pertinent instrument, the 1977 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral 
Resources11 (designed to apply to the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Northern 
Atlantic Ocean), whilst containing provisions channelling the liability towards the 
operator and entitling the latter to limit such liability to a certain monetary amount, has 
not entered into force so far and is highly unlikely to do so in the future. 
Other regimes, such as the Mediterranean Offshore Protocol12 that has already been 
touched upon above, whilst mentioning the need for a liability and compensation 
mechanism, have fallen short of devising a comprehensive regime. Its Art. 27, par. 1, in 
fact, merely requires contracting parties to “cooperate as soon as possible in 
formulating and adopting appropriate rules and procedures for the determination of 
liability and compensation for damage resulting from the activities dealt with in [the] 
Protocol”. 
In the meantime, “pending development of such procedures”, parties are called upon 
by Art. 27, par. 2, on the one hand, (a) to “take all measures necessary to ensure that 
liability for damage caused by activities is imposed on operators, and that they shall be 
required to pay prompt and adequate compensation” and, on the other hand, (b) to 
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 See, for example, L. CHABASON, Offshore oil exploitation: a new frontier for international 
environmental law (IDDRI Working Paper no. 11/11) (available online at 
http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-debat/WP%201111_chabason_offshore.pdf). 
9
 Originally adopted on 29 November 1969 and entered into force at the international level on 19 June 
1975; subsequently replaced by a new version thereof adopted on 27 November 1992 which entered into 
force at the international level on 30 May 1996. 
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 Originally adopted on 18 December 1971 and entered into force at the international level on 16 October 
1978; superseded by a new version thereof adopted on 27 November 1992 which entered into force at the 
international level on 1 May 1996. 
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 Adopted on on 1 May 1977 and never entered into force. 
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 On which see also T. SCOVAZZI, UNEP: The Fifth Protocol to the Barcelona Convention on the 
Protection of the Mediterranean, in The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 1995, 543 ff., 
as well as E. RAFTOPOULOS, Sustainable Governance of Offshore Oil and Gas Development in the 
Mediterranean: Revitalizing the Dormant Mediterranean Offshore Protocol, available online at 
http://www.mepielan-
ebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&CategoryId=4&ArticleId=29&Article=Sustainable-Governance-of-
Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Development-in-the-Mediterranean:-Revitalizing-the-Dormant-Mediterranean-
Offshore-Protocol. 
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“take all measures necessary to ensure that operators shall have and maintain 
insurance cover or other financial security of such type and under such terms as the 
Contracting Party shall specify in order to ensure compensation for damage caused by 
the activities covered by [the] Protocol”. 
The position within the Barcelona system in general is, to say the truth, not much 
more advanced, if one considers that the only instrument existing on liability and 
compensation is currently represented by (non-mandatory) guidelines adopted by the 
16th Meeting of the Contracting Parties in January 2008.13 
As a consequence of the (late) entry into force of the Offshore Protocol, which is 
now binding for six States plus the European Union, we now face a situation which is, 
in all fairness, no much less uncertain and fragmented than it used to be in the past, at 
least from the standpoint of liability and compensation for damages caused in 
connection with offshore oil and gas activities. 
Admittedly, for those States that are contracting parties to the Offshore Protocol (as 
well as for the European Union) we have clearly moved from a scenario where no 
international regime (of regional character) existed to one which is indeed subject to a 
definite set of rules devoted to exploration and exploitation activities of the continental 
shelf, its seabed and its seafloor. 
If we look at the substance of such rules, however, it has to be recognized that, far 
from having introduced a uniform legal regime (unlike the 1992 Civil Liability 
Convention that has been mentioned above), the Offshore Protocol heavily relies on the 
legislation of its contracting parties for the purpose of ensuring, on the one hand, a 
certain degree of cooperation for the formulation and adoption of “appropriate rules 
and procedures for the determination of liability and compensation”. On the other hand 
and on an interim basis (i.e., pending the development of the relevant procedures), 
operators are required to pay “prompt and adequate compensation” (to what extent, 
according to what standards and for what kind of damage is not specified, though), 
should an accident occur, and an “insurance cover or other financial security” shall be 
set up “of such type and under such terms” … as the contracting party concerned itself 
shall specify! 
The current scenario is, in addition, legally fragmented, too, if one considers that the 
above rules only apply, within the Mediterranean Sea area, to a handful of coastal 
States, giving them a competitive disadvantage in the lucrative offshore oil and gas 
business vis-à-vis States that have not yet ratified the Offshore Protocol. This is bound 
to potentially negatively affect the success of the Protocol in two different (although 
interrelated) ways: first of all, by possibly discouraging Mediterranean States from 
becoming parties to the Protocol and, secondly, by driving those that may decide to 
become parties towards the adoption of liability standards and compensation rules that 
are not particularly stringent. 
The above considerations, which apply to the Mediterranean Sea as a whole, are 
particularly significant in sub-regional contexts which feature the presence of EU as 
well as non-EU Member States, which is notably the case of the Adriatic and Ionian 
area with specific regard to the position of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Montenegro.  Indeed, especially due to the increasing interest for offshore activities in 
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Damage that Can Be Compensated, in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online, 2009, 183 
ff.. 
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that part of the Mediterranean Sea, one may see the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (also) as 
an appropriate framework for ensuring a prompt ratification process of the Offshore 
Protocol (to which Albania, but not the two other non-EU Member States, is at present a 
contracting party). 
 
 
3. Directive 2013/30/EU on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations: What 
Room for the Polluter Pays Principle? 
 
Given the unsatisfactory situation that currently exists at the international level, as 
briefly represented in the previous section, it is important to ascertain whether or not the 
European Union has been able to take the lead towards the establishment of more 
adequate liability and compensation rules in the field of offshore oil and gas exploration 
and exploitation. Reference has therefore to be made, in this respect, to the already 
mentioned Directive 2013/30 on safety of offshore oil and gas operations. 
At the outset, however, it is appropriate to recall that, as widely know, art. 191.2 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, provides that the environmental 
policy of the European Union shall, inter alia, be based on the principle that the polluter 
shall pay. Such principle is generally considered to imply, on the one hand, a 
prohibition of environmental State subsidies and, on the other hand, the enactment of 
appropriate liability and compensation rules. 
The principle has been implemented in several pieces of secondary legislation and 
has been addressed in a comprehensive manner through the adoption of Directive 
2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedy of environmental 
damage.14 
In a paper which is the process of being published, I have taken the view (which I 
maintain here) that, so far, the European Union has failed to properly implement the 
polluter pays principle into its offshore oil and gas legislation. 
On the one hand, in fact, it appears from the wording of that the European Union 
(and its legislators) are fully aware of the intricate liability issues that are likely to arise 
out of an accident occurred in connection with the running of an offshore installation, 
especially when such accident happens to have transboundary implications. On the 
other hand, however, no significant substantive measure has been provided for by the 
2013 Directive in order to address such issues, perhaps due to the perceived urgency to 
adopt at least a set of minimum preventive rules, which brings us back to the 
considerations that have been developed in the first section of the present paper 
concerning the (wrong) perception of liability as a measure of last resort. 
It is interesting to recall, by way of an example, that recital No. 9 of the Directive 
recognises the limits of the existing (national) liability regimes, by pointing out that 
under such regimes “the party responsible may not only be clearly identifiable and may 
not be able, or liable, to pay all the costs to remedy the damage it has caused”. Later 
on, it is also stated that “as no existing financial security instruments, including risk 
pooling arrangements, can accommodate all possible consequences of major accidents, 
the Commission should undertake further analysis and studies of the appropriate 
measures to ensure an adequately robust liability regime for damages relating to 
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offshore oil and gas operations, requirements on financial capacity including 
availability of appropriated financial security instruments or other arrangements” 
(recital no 63). 
The result is that, under Art. 39 of the Directive, the Commission is required, by the 
end of 2014, to submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report “on the 
availability of financial security instruments and on the handling of compensation 
claims, where appropriate, accompanied by proposals” and that, in turn, by 19 July 
2015, the Commission shall submit to the same institutions “a report on its assessment 
of the effectiveness of the liability regimes in the Union in respect of the damage caused 
by offshore oil and gas operations”, along with an “assessment of the appropriateness 
of broadening liability provisions”, to be accompanied again, “where appropriate, by 
proposals”. 
At a closer scrutiny there appears to have been only one (limited) intervention of 
substance effected by Directive 2013/30, consisting in the amendment of the 2004 
Liability Directive in order to take into account some of the peculiarities of the offshore 
oil and gas sector. 
Art. 38, in this respect, extends the scope of application of the said Directive also to 
damage adversely affecting the environmental status of “waters, the seabed and subsoil 
on the seaward side of the baseline from which the extent of territorial waters is 
measured extending to the outmost reach of the area where a Member State has and/or 
exercises jurisdictional rights, in accordance with the [United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea], with the exception of waters adjacent to the countries and 
territories mentioned in Annex II to the Treaty and the French Overseas Departments 
and Collectivities”. 
The Liability Directive, however, is in itself open to criticism due to its restricted 
definition of ‘recoverable damage’ and the limited role accorded to individuals as 
opposed to public authorities. It is therefore unfortunate that the Offshore Directive 
confines itself to requesting to Member States, “[w]ithout prejudice to the existing 
scope of liability relating to the prevention and remediation of environmental damage 
pursuant to Directive 2004/35/EC”, to “ensure that the licensee is financially liable for 
the prevention and remediation of environmental damage as defined in that Directive, 
caused by offshore oil and gas operations carried out by, or on behalf of, the licensee or 
the operator” (Art. 7).15 
 
 
4. Civil Liability and Compensation for Offshore Activities under EU and 
International Law: What Lies ahead? 
 
Within the on-going normative process that has been described in the previous 
section, a report dealing with “civil liability, financial security and compensation claims 
for offshore oil and gas activities in the European Economic Area” was published on 
behalf of the European Commission on 14 August 2014.16 
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The study, which is based on the analysis of the legislations of 20 “Target States” (18 
EU Member States and two EEA Member States), is intended to assist the Commission 
in the preparation of the two reports provided for by Art. 39 of the Offshore Directive 
by assessing, for each and every State concerned, the effectiveness of existing liability 
regimes for bodily injury, property damage and economic loss (so-called “traditional 
damage”), the handling of compensation claims and the availability of financial security 
instruments for compensation of the above heads of damage from offshore oil and gas 
operations. 
The conclusions reached by the report are quite discomforting. The point is made, in 
particular, that, should an accident such as the Deepwater Horizon disaster occur in 
European waters, there would be no liability, in most Target States, for many third-party 
claims for “traditional damage” as well as no regime, in the vast majority of Target 
States, to handle compensation payments. 
The grounds on which such conclusions are based are of various nature, and include 
the non-recognition of liability for pure economic loss (i.e. loss which is independent 
from a bodily or otherwise physical damage) in a number of jurisdictions or, 
alternatively, the existence of general tort law criteria that may render difficult (and 
sometimes almost impossible) for the criteria themselves to be met in pure economic 
loss cases. In addition, the geographical scope of application of the laws of some Target 
States is sometimes doubtful, as it is not sure whether accidents occurring on the 
continental shelf or in the exclusive economic zone would be covered or not. 
It is likely that the findings of the above-mentioned study will prompt the European 
Commission to propose a series of amendments to the Directive, with a view to fill the 
liability loophole that has been identified in the previous sections. 
There is no room, in the context of the present paper, to discuss the features of a 
possible, future European liability offshore regime in any detail. It has to be noted, 
however, that in the past European legislators have been unable to agree on crucial 
issues such as the notion of recoverable damage, the standard of liability, the 
establishment of a compensation fund and other relevant aspects. This has been the 
case, for example, in the context of the proposed (and later abandoned) European-wide 
oil pollution liability regime to supplement the already mentioned 1992 International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage and the 1992 International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage. More recently, the project to insert civil liability provisions into the 
2004 Liability Directive also failed, thus rendering the Liability Directive a “public 
law” instrument. Whilst one has to be that better results can be achieved in the field of 
offshore oil and gas activities, the diverging legal traditions and approaches of the 
various Member States may well turn out to be an insurmountable obstacle. 
A few closing remarks have to be made in respect of possible developments at the 
international level. It is interesting to note, for example, that in a recent speech delivered 
in April 2015 at the Sea Asia 2015 conference, the outgoing Secretary-General of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) called for the offshore sector to establish 
some form of global governance similar to the one that exists in shipping. 
According to available reports (the speech has not yet been made available on the 
website of the IMO), the Secretary-General pointed out that the level of regulation in 
the offshore industry remained relatively light compared to shipping and that it would 
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be, at the end of the day, for the relevant actors themselves to figure out about the 
appropriateness and desirability of a global governing body17 
For the time being, as it has been explained in the previous paragraphs, in spite of 
recent efforts, including within the IMO, no global regime exists or is being negotiated 
with regard to oil and gas offshore activities either dealing with the preventive aspects 
thereof or with compensation and liability for damage arising therefrom. 
Such a situation, which is perceived as being clearly unsatisfactory by an increasing 
number of observers, may change in the future especially thanks to the efforts carried 
out by prominent non-governmental organizations. The Institut du Développement 
Durable et des Relations Internationales (IDDRI)18, based in Paris, has for example put 
the issue of offshore activities at the top of its agenda, which has led to a series of 
events and publications calling for a “strengthening of the framework regulating 
offshore oil and gas activities” that have significantly contributed to the debate.  
With particular regard to the liability implications, the Global Oceans Commission,19 
in addition, has put forth a specific proposal (out of a total of eight) concerning offshore 
oil and gas and, in particular, the establishment of “binding international safety 
standards and liability”, highlighting its support for “the elaboration of an international 
convention regulating liability and compensation” covering “economic loss and 
ecological damages”, providing for “strict liability of operators”, including 
“provisions for a shared liability between licence holders and their subcontractors”, 
binding “States to ensure that operators have adequate financial capacity to pay for 
possible compensation” and setting “a liability cap at a level that can ensure the 
recovery of costs associated with environmental remediation and compensation and 
losses born by public and private entities, as well as a compensation fund to address 
major disasters that are likely to exceed the liability cap”. 
Last but not least, the Comité Maritime International (CMI)20.has set up an 
International Working Group on “offshore activities” that, pursuant to the well-
established CMI “method”, has produced a questionnaire for national maritime 
associations (which has received eighteen replies so far ) and two interim reports. Work 
is still going on and is likely to bring about significant results in terms of possible 
recommendations to the international community in the near future. 
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